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Internet Intermediary Liability in 
Defamation
EMILy B. LAIDLAW AND HILARy yOUNG*
Given the broad meaning of publication in defamation law, internet intermediaries such as 
internet service providers, search engines, and social media companies may be liable for 
defamatory content posted by third parties. This article argues that current law is not suitable 
to dealing with issues of internet defamation and intermediary responsibility because it is 
needlessly complex, confusing, and may impose liability without blameworthiness. Instead, 
the article proposes that publication be redefined to require a deliberate act of communicating 
specific words. This would better reflect blameworthiness and few intermediaries would be 
liable in defamation under this test. That said, intermediaries profit from content, and they 
have the capacity and flexibility to respond to defamation in a way that courts cannot. The 
paper therefore also proposes a regulatory framework called notice-and-notice-plus. This 
would require intermediaries to forward a notice of complaint to content creators, and only to 
remove content in limited circumstances.
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It is arguable that the expansion of the concept of publication beyond primary authors, 
editors and publishers should be seen as a profound misstep in the development of the law, 
and one that should be rectified.1
IMAGINE THAT EMILY AND HILARY create a legal academia blog using the 
WordPress platform. They believe that a colleague has been plagiarizing her 
articles and they accuse her on the blog. The blog post is widely shared on 
Facebook and Twitter. The colleague has not, in fact, plagiarized anything but 
now her reputation is at risk and she is in damage control mode. One of her 
options is a defamation action. She can sue Emily and Hilary, who are clearly 
publishers of the allegations (publication being an element of defamation). But 
is WordPress a publisher? Are the internet service providers (ISPs) that carried 
the information? What about Facebook and Twitter? What if a Google search 
1. Andrew Scott, “Reform of Defamation Law in Northern Ireland: Recommendations to the 
Department of Finance” (2016), 2.54, online: <www.finance-ni.gov.uk/sites/default/files/
publications/dfp/report-on-defamation-law.pdf> [perma.cc/5RG2-5HJP].
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for the colleague’s name now links her to plagiarism? Is Google a publisher and 
potentially liable in defamation?
In Canada, the answers to these questions about the liability of internet 
intermediaries in defamation depend on the definition of publication at common 
law, which has traditionally been broad, allowing some intermediaries to be 
considered publishers. Common law doctrine is evolving to deal with these 
questions, but in complex, sometimes contradictory, and often unsatisfactory 
ways. The only other obligations on intermediaries with regard to defamatory 
content are contained in their own terms of service, which they create and enforce.
Some foreign jurisdictions have legislated on the matter. The regulatory 
models vary. The pendulum swings between broad immunity models (USA); 
stricter safe harbour models, better known as notice and takedown (NTD) 
(evident in Europe); human rights frameworks (evident in Brazil and civil society 
frameworks such as the Manila Principles); and Canada’s middle-path notice 
and notice regime for copyright law. With the notice and notice framework an 
intermediary does not risk liability for copyright infringement, but rather risks a 
fine for failure to pass on notices of copyright infringement to the relevant user.
In this article, we recommend a new approach to the issue of internet 
intermediary liability in defamation. We begin by setting out the Canadian 
law and suggest that the status quo is unsatisfactory for three reasons. First, 
the law is complex, leading to errors and inconsistent application. Second, the 
law assigns responsibility to actors whose role in reputational harm is at least 
arguably insufficiently blameworthy to justify liability. Third, the existing 
law creates incentives for intermediaries to take down anything alleged to be 
defamatory, since failure to do so can make them legally responsible. Alleging 
to an intermediary that content is defamatory can therefore have the same effect 
as obtaining an injunction, but without meeting the high legal threshold for 
injunctive relief.
We then propose a two-part solution to the problem of internet intermediary 
liability. The first part is to narrow the common-law definition of publication 
so at to require a deliberate act of communicating specific words. Under such 
a definition, intermediaries would rarely be considered publishers of content 
generated by third parties.
However, we recognize that intermediaries incentivize content and often 
profit from it. They have considerable power to mediate between those who post 
content and those who object to it. We therefore also recommend obligations 
be imposed on intermediaries. Modelled on Canada’s notice and notice regime 
in copyright law, we call this framework of obligations notice-and-notice-
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plus. Essentially, following an allegation that content is defamatory, certain 
intermediaries would have to pass on notice to the primary publisher(s). Only 
in certain limited circumstances would the intermediary be required to remove 
content. Further, the consequences of failing to follow the regulations would be 
a fine—not liability in defamation.
I. INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM OF INTERNET 
INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY IN DEFAMATION
A. DOCTRINE
Internet intermediary liability in defamation is grounded in the concept of 
publication in defamation law, publication being one of the elements of the 
tort. Publishing essentially means conveying, in a comprehensible form, the 
content complained of to someone who then understood it.2 Conveying includes 
participating in conveying, even without recourse to principles of vicarious 
or accessory liability: “[L]iability extends to any person who participated in, 
secured, or authorised the publication.”3 It is also well-established that repeating 
defamatory content amounts to publishing it.4 The Supreme Court of Canada 
acknowledged in Crookes v Newton that: “[T]he breadth of activity captured by 
the traditional publication rule is vast.”5
Defamation is strict liability in that the defendant did not have to intend 
to defame. The orthodox view is that she did not even have to be aware of the 
content she was transmitting (although this is changing, as discussed below).6 For 
example, an illiterate printing press operator was held responsible for defamatory 
content on the basis that he had operated the press.7 Thus, “a very wide class 
2. See e.g. Crookes v Newton, 2011 SCC 47 at para 16 [Crookes], citing McNichol v Grandy, 
[1931] SCR 696 at 699 (The defendant must have, “by any act, conveyed defamatory 
meaning to a single third party who has received it” [emphasis in original]). See also Patrick 
Milmo et al, eds, Gatley on Libel and Slander, 12th ed (London, UK: Thomson Reuters, 
2013) at para 6.1.
3. Milmo et al, supra note 2 at para 6.10.
4. Ibid at para 11.18.
5. Crookes, supra note 2 at para 18.
6. Joachim Dietrich, “Clarifying the Meaning of ‘Publication’ of Defamatory Matter in the Age 
of the Internet” (2013) 18 Media & Arts L Rev 88 at 90. See also Grant v Torstar Corp, 2009 
SCC 61 at para 28 [Grant].
7. R v Clerk (1728), 94 ER 207.
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of persons may be caught as publishers, including quite peripheral, seemingly 
innocent players.”8
This was once a marginal issue; plaintiffs were rarely so wrongheaded as to 
sue the printing press operator or newsagent who sold a newspaper containing 
a libel. But in the internet era, the issue has gained new importance. Given the 
international nature of internet communications and the fact that anyone can 
publish, plaintiffs may not be able to hold to account those most responsible 
for publishing a libel. Potential defendants may be anonymous, outside of 
the jurisdiction, or judgment-proof. Intermediaries are sometimes the only 
viable defendants. If the plaintiff wants expression removed from the internet, 
contacting the intermediary may be the path of least resistance. Further, the way 
intermediaries benefit from content leads some to believe the intermediaries 
should bear legal responsibility for what they convey.
We are therefore faced with questions about the potential liability 
and responsibility of internet intermediaries. Taking the example from the 
introductory paragraph, WordPress, ISPs, Facebook, Twitter, and Google all 
participate in conveying the defamatory allegation that our colleague plagiarized 
her work. But their roles in conveying libelous content vary considerably.
Before examining how the common law has been applied to intermediaries, 
we must first explore publication doctrine in more detail. Specifically, 
it is necessary to understand the concepts of innocent dissemination and 
publication by omission.
Innocent dissemination is a defence that arose, beginning with Emmens v 
Pottle in 1885, to address the injustice of holding the printing press operator or 
newsagent liable.9 It applies where the defendant is a secondary publisher who 
published without knowledge of the defamatory content or reason to suspect the 
work contained defamatory content (i.e., negligence). Secondary publishers are 
those who have a “peripheral role” in publication.10 They “are not the printer or 
the first or main publisher of a work that contains a libel”11 and are often defined 
8. Dietrich, supra note 6 at 92.
9. (1885), 16 QBD 354 (CA) at 357 [Emmens].
10. Dietrich, supra note 6 at 91. See also ibid at 357; Weldon v “The Times” Book Company Ltd 
(1911), 28 TLR 143 (CA). See also Crookes, supra note 2 at para 20 (the Supreme Court of 
Canada has cited the rule in obiter dicta). Matthew Collins discusses whether this means that 
the defendant must know the publication contains words with defamatory meaning, or that 
they are actually defamatory in the sense of not being defensible. See Matthew Collins, 
The Law of Defamation and the Internet, 3d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 
paras 17.09-17.15.
11. Vizetelly v Mudie’s Select Library Ltd, [1900] 2 QB 170 at 180 [Vizetelly].
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in contrast to “primary publisher.” Primary publishers “have or can readily 
acquire full knowledge of the publication’s content before its release and are able 
to control and, if necessary, prevent dissemination of such content.”12
Innocent dissemination has been applied to “news agents, booksellers, and 
libraries,”13 although not to letter carriers, whose role has been said to be too 
peripheral to constitute publication at all. If the basis for the distinction between 
letter carriers and newsagents is not immediately apparent to readers, they can 
perhaps take some comfort in the fact that it has never been apparent to the 
courts either.14
The need for the innocent dissemination doctrine may be waning, as courts 
have been departing from the orthodox view and beginning to require knowledge 
as a requirement for publication. That is, rather than being a publisher with 
an innocent dissemination defence, one who lacks knowledge of the expression 
conveyed is not a publisher at all. This began with the creation of the “passive 
instrument” doctrine in Bunt v Tilley: In that case, the England and Wales Court 
of Queen’s Bench held that publishing requires “knowing involvement in the 
process of publication of the relevant words.”15 This approach has been influential 
and was cited with approval, albeit in obiter dicta, by Justice Abella in Crookes v 
Newton.16 Similarly, Justice Deschamps, concurring in Crookes v Newton, proposed 
that publication only occurs where the defendant performs a deliberate act that 
makes defamatory content “readily available to a third party in a comprehensible 
form.”17 Lower courts have repeated both Justice Abella’s endorsement of the 
Bunt v Tilley approach and Justice Deschamps’ “deliberate act” approach and 
have generally interpreted them as meaning that “some awareness of the nature 
of the reader posts is necessary to meet the test of publication.”18
12. Oriental Press v Fevaworks Solutions Ltd, [2013] HKCFA 47 at para 57 [Oriental Press].
13. Crookes, supra note 2 at para 20, citing Allen M Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian 
Tort Law, 8th ed (Markham: LexisNexis, 2006) at 783-784. See also Raymond Brown, 
Defamation Law: A Primer (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 117-18 (those who “play a 
subordinate role includ[e] printers, carriers, vendors, and other distributors.”).
14. Vizetelly, supra note 11 at 80 (Romer LJ stated, “I do not think that the judgements 
very clearly indicate on what principle Courts ought to act in dealing with similar 
cases in future.”).
15. Bunt v Tilley, [2006] EWHC 407 (QB) at para 23 [Bunt] [emphasis omitted].
16. Crookes, supra note 2 at para 21.
17. Ibid at para 59.
18. Weaver v Corcoran, 2015 BCSC 165 at para 282 [Weaver]. See also Pritchard v Van Nes, 2016 
BCSC 686 at para 108 [Pritchard].
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That said, given continued explicit and implicit reliance on the doctrine of 
secondary publication and innocent dissemination,19 it is too soon to declare 
them dead in Canadian law.
A third doctrine further complicates matters. Publication by omission relates 
to communications that were not originally made by the defendant, but that were 
placed in a venue that he or she controls. If the defendant refuses to remove the 
communication and the refusal can be interpreted as endorsing it, the defendant 
will become a publisher of that communication from the time he or she should 
have removed it. The doctrine was set out in Byrne v Deane,20 in which someone 
anonymously posted a message on a golf course bulletin board. The management 
was made aware of it and when they failed to remove it, they were held liable as 
publishers of the message. The court articulated the following test:
[H]aving regard to all the facts of the case, is the proper inference that, by not 
removing the defamatory matter, the defendant really made himself responsible for 
its continued presence in the place where it had been put?21
The test is often easily made out as courts readily draw inferences of 
responsibility or endorsement from a failure to remove content. An inference of 
endorsement “would ordinarily be drawn” unless removal would require “very 
great trouble and expense.”22 “Ordinarily” drawing an inference of endorsement 
was likely problematic even in Victorian times but is even more so in the context 
of internet intermediaries. The vast amount of expression hosted, the nature of 
the intermediary, and the existence of terms of service may all militate against 
the conclusion that intermediaries endorse expression they fail to remove. 
As such, courts are, in our view, wrong to draw an inference of endorsement 
from a mere failure to remove expression. After all, these are distinct elements of 
publication by omission.
The doctrines of secondary publisher or innocent dissemination and 
publication by omission are distinct. They are similar in that both tend to turn on 
proof of knowledge, but there are important differences. First, the onus of proof 
is different (defendant proves lack of knowledge for innocent dissemination; 
plaintiff proves the defendant’s knowledge for publication by omission). Second, 
secondary publishers are publishers from the outset, whereas publishers by 
omission only become responsible after their failure to remove content. Third, 
one can be a secondary publisher without actual knowledge of the defamatory 
19. See e.g. Baglow v Smith, 2015 ONSC 1175 [Baglow]; see also Oriental Press, supra note 12.
20. Byrne v Deane, [1937] 2 All ER 204 [Byrne].
21. Ibid at 212.
22. Ibid at 213.
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publication. That is not true of publishers by omission. Fourth, publishers by 
omission must not only know of the third-party communication, their failure to 
do anything about it must be interpreted as acquiescence or endorsement. But as 
just noted, such inferences are readily drawn.
Courts have often confused or conflated the doctrines. In Murray v Wishart, 
the New Zealand Court of Appeal overturned a trial decision in part because the 
judge applied the knowledge requirement for secondary publishers (constructive 
knowledge) to a publisher by omission (which requires actual knowledge).23 
In Weaver v Corcoran,24 the Supreme Court of British Columbia stated that 
once the National Post newspaper became aware of content on its site and failed 
to take it down, it would become a publisher. By ignoring the requirement 
of endorsement, this either conflates publishing by omission and secondary 
publishing (since no endorsement is required for the latter) or at least misstates 
the requirements for publishing by omission.
In Bottrill v Bailey, an Australian Capital Territory tribunal held that the 
defendant, who had posted a link to a YouTube video, was a publisher by omission 
of the content of that video.25 It is certainly unusual to construe someone who 
deliberately created a link to content as a publisher by omission of that content. 
Publishers by omission are usually responsible for others’ acts of publication in 
a space they control, not for their own acts of conveying content. The holding is 
perhaps arguable, but this oddity was not discussed.
Finally, in Pritchard v Van Nes,26 the Supreme Court of British Columbia 
looked to cases involving both innocent dissemination (Carter v BC Federation 
of Foster Parents)27 and publication by omission (Weaver).28 It inferred from them 
the existence of a single test in which liability for third-party expression requires:
1) actual knowledge of the defamatory material posted by the third party, 2) a 
deliberate act that can include inaction in the face of actual knowledge, and 3) 
power and control over the defamatory content. After meeting these elements, it 
may be said that a defendant has adopted the third party defamatory material as 
their own.29
23. Murray v Wishart, [2014] NZCA 461 at paras 128-29 [Murray].
24. Weaver, supra note 18 at para 284.
25. Bottrill v Bailey (Civil Dispute), [2018] ACAT 45 at para 141.
26. Pritchard, supra note 18 at paras 99, 102.
27. Carter v BC Federation of Foster Parents Assn, 2005 BCCA 398.
28. Weaver, supra note 18.
29. Pritchard, supra note 18 at para 108.
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The court seems to have conflated two lines of doctrine, effectively rejecting 
the common law of secondary publishing/innocent dissemination and of 
publication by omission. It is open to courts to alter the law in this area, but here 
the court did so without any explanation or justification. Particularly problematic 
is the automatic inference of endorsement where there is knowledge and control.
B. APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE TO INTERMEDIARIES
With all this by way of introduction, we turn to how the law of publication, 
including innocent dissemination and publication by omission, has been applied 
to internet intermediaries. Although the case law is still developing, there are 
enough cases from Canada and other common law jurisdictions to permit certain 
conclusions to be drawn.
Because publication means conveying or participating in conveying 
information to others, intermediaries are often at least arguably publishers. ISPs 
allow information to be transmitted to and from their customers. Search engines 
make information available to users and create snippets and autocompletes based 
on searches and content generated by others. Social networks provide platforms 
for third-party content and make that content available to billions of people 
around the world. Media companies may host comments sections, making 
third-party content readily available through their websites.
We discuss the treatment of three different kinds of intermediaries: ISPs, 
platforms/hosts and search engines.30 Although the range of intermediaries is 
probably better thought of as a continuum, these categories are widely used and 
reflect relevantly different relationships between the intermediary and defamatory 
communications.
30. Although there has been no litigation in the defamation context confirming they would be 
treated identically, other infrastructure-type intermediaries, such as VPNs and DNS servers 
would likely be treated like ISPs. See Jaani Riordan, The Liability of Internet Intermediaries 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 12.90. Platforms or hosts tend to be defined 
in terms of being the primary storage site for content. They are therefore different from 
intermediaries that cache (temporarily store content). See Collins, supra note 10 at 
6.04-6.05. Although some laws treat intermediaries that cache differently than those that 
host for the purposes of describing the common law approach to defamation, there is no 
basis for drawing this distinction. See e.g. EC, Commission Directive 2000/31/EC of 8 June 
2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, 
in the Internal Market, [2000] OJ, L 178/1 at 13 [ECD].
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1. INTERNET SERVICE pROVIDERS (ISpS)
The case law is consistent in holding that ISPs are not primary or secondary 
publishers.31 Although they do participate in conveying defamatory content, and 
might be caught under the traditional broad definition of publication, courts 
have tended to declare ISPs to be “passive instruments.”32 The concept of a passive 
instrument is a recent creation of the common law, and amounts to a narrowing 
of the definition of publication. It was introduced in Bunt v Tilley,33 an English 
case in which Justice Eady held that the ISPs’ role was so passive that they should 
not be considered publishers at all. The courts of several countries, including 
Canada, have endorsed this approach.34 Although there have been no Canadian 
defamation cases of which we are aware involving ISPs alleged to be publishers, 
Justice Deschamps, concurring in Crookes v Newton, said that the approach to ISPs 
in Bunt v Tilley should be adopted in Canada (i.e., ISPs are passive instruments, 
not publishers).35 In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has treated ISPs as 
non-publishers (conduits) in the context of the Copyright Act.36
ISPs are also unlikely to be considered publishers by omission. This has not, 
to our knowledge, been litigated. However, the fact that ISPs cannot remove 
content from the internet—at most they can block access to websites—suggests 
that they do not have the necessary control to be considered publishers by 
omission. Further, the fact that the ISPs in Bunt were not held liable as publishers 
by omission, combined with the general approval of Bunt in Canada, suggests 
that even after notice, ISPs will not be found to be publishers by omission.
31. See e.g. Godfrey v Demon Internet Service, [2001] QB 201. An ISP was found to be a 
secondary publisher, but in that case its role was effectively that of a content host, not 
that of an ISP.
32. See e.g. Bunt, supra note 15. See also Collins, supra note 10 at 6.49-117 (Bunt is the first case 
to refer to passive instruments, also known as mere conduits).
33. Bunt, supra note 32.
34. See e.g. Crookes, supra note 2 at para 89; Niemela v Malamas, 2015 BCSC 1024 at para 
83 [Niemela]. While the United States had no need to endorse the approach, given broad 
immunities in its Communications Decency Act, 47 USC § 230 [CDA], its early case law 
also held an ISP not to be a publisher. See e.g. Cubby v CompuServe Inc, 776 F Supp 
135 (SD NY 1991).
35. Crookes, supra note 2 at para 89.
36. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Canadian Assn of Internet 
Providers, 2004 SCC 45 at para 100-101.
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2. pLATFORMS AND HOSTS
The next category to consider is that of intermediaries that host third-party 
content. The case law is not consistent as to whether they are publishers, and if 
so, what kind. Some platforms have been held to be secondary publishers with a 
potential innocent dissemination defence, so long as they lacked knowledge and 
were not negligent. This was the case in Baglow v Smith,37 a Canadian case, and 
in Oriental Press v Fevaworks,38 a Hong Kong case.
More often, however, platforms have been treated as non-publishers (passive 
instruments) until notice, and then publishers by omission if they fail to remove 
content after notice. This was the case in Tamiz v Google39 (England), Murray v 
Wishart40 (New Zealand), and Weaver v Corcoran,41 a decision of the Supreme 
Court of British Columbia.
3. SEARCH ENGINES
Search engines are an especially difficult category of intermediary. This is because 
unlike platforms, search engines do not simply make third-party content 
available—their algorithms generate new content, or a new context for content, 
based on what others have posted online. This takes the form of text in the 
hyperlinks to search engine results, snippets of information (i.e., the underlying 
descriptive text) and autocompletes.
Courts in England and Canada have tended to treat search engines as passive 
instruments (i.e., not publishers) with regard to the snippets they generate. 
Metropolitan International Schools v Designtechnica (MIS) 42 is an English example 
of this approach, while Niemela v Malamas43 is a Canadian example.
As for whether the search engine would be a publisher by omission after 
notice, in Niemela v Malamas only pre-notice conduct was at issue, so the judge 
37. Baglow, supra note 19 at paras 192-96. The court did not specify whether the defendants 
were publishers based on the primary publisher, secondary publisher or publisher by 
omission doctrines. However, given the reference to the third-party content creator being 
the primary publisher, we infer the hosts were not liable as primary publishers. And given 
analogies the court drew to hyperlinking, we infer that the court was not invoking the 
publication by omission doctrine.
38. Oriental Press, supra note 12. See also Godfrey, supra note 31.
39. [2013] EWCA Civ 68.
40. [2014] 3 NZLR 722 at para 129, aff’d Murray, supra note 23.
41. Weaver, supra note 18, rev’d on other grounds 2017 BCCA 160.
42. [2009] EWHC 1765 [MIS].
43. Niemela, supra note 34.
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declined to decide the effect of notice.44 In MIS, the court implied that notice 
would not transform the search engine into a publisher by omission, because no 
acquiescence could be inferred,45 but it is not clear that Canada will take the same 
approach, especially given the courts’ tendency readily to infer acquiescence from 
a refusal to remove expression. The question is unresolved in New Zealand46 and 
Hong Kong,47 where actions based on Google being a publisher of search results 
or autocompletes have survived motions to strike.
The issue is also unresolved in Australia.48 However, Australia has shown 
the greatest inclination to treat search engines as publishers. In Trkulja v Google, 
Justice Beach concluded that it was open to a jury to consider Google a publisher. 
He considered that search engines have an innocent dissemination defence until 
the matter is brought to their attention, but they may lose this defence with 
notice, since they no longer lack knowledge of the defamatory contents. Justice 
Beach found that Google could also be a publisher by omission as endorsement 
could be inferred.49
In summary, courts are applying the common law of publication to 
intermediaries and sometimes taking very different approaches. All seem to agree 
that ISPs are not publishers, but the status of platforms and search engines varies. 
Regardless of their varying status before notice, most courts have found that 
platforms are publishers by omission after they receive notice. Search engines 
have been treated as passive instruments and publishers before notice, but in 
Canada it is unclear what their status is after notice.
44. Ibid at paras 56, 108.
45. MIS, supra note 42 at paras 58, 114.
46. A v Google New Zealand Ltd, [2012] NZHC 2352 at paras 68, 71.
47. Dr Yeung, Sau Shing Albert v Google Inc, [2014] HKCFI 1404.
48. Trkulja v Google Inc LLC & Anor (No 5), [2012] VSC 533 [Trkulja]; Duffy v Google, 
[2015] SASC 170 at paras 29-31. Note that in these cases, the courts upheld jury verdicts. 
They do not stand for the proposition that Google search results, when read, necessarily 
constitute publication.
49. Trkulja, supra note 48 at paras 18-31. Trkulja was recently appealed to the High Court 
of Australia, which admonished the Court of Appeal for having decided the issue of 
publication. The High Court said the question was fact-dependent: “[T]here can be no 
certainty as to the nature and extent of Google’s involvement in the compilation and 
publication of its search engine results until after discovery.” See Trkulja v Google LLC, 
[2018] HCA 25 at para 39.
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C. PROBLEMS WITH THE COMMON LAW APPROACH
The common law approach is problematic for three reasons: First, the law is 
unduly complex and has sometimes been interpreted inconsistently. The rule 
of law requires that people be able to know what conduct is unlawful and 
what conduct is not. Complexity and inconsistency both limit one’s ability to 
determine what the law is.
Second, the law arguably imposes liability in the absence of blameworthiness. 
Tort law generally requires wrongdoing for liability. The tendency in Canadian 
law is to find that intermediaries without knowledge of the contents are passive 
instruments and not publishers. As such, they are not subject to strict liability. 
However, even after notice, the role of certain intermediaries in defaming is 
arguably too tenuous to justify liability for content in the same way, and to the 
same extent, as primary publishers. This is not to suggest that intermediaries 
should have no responsibility for content—as discussed below, we believe they 
should have statutory obligations when an allegation of defamation is made. But 
responsibility need not mean liability in defamation.
Third, holding intermediaries liable if they do not remove content after 
notice (or even uncertainty as to whether they’ll be liable) creates an incentive for 
intermediaries to remove content based on nothing more than a bald allegation it 
is defamatory. This has serious consequences for freedom of expression.
We therefore ultimately recommend significant changes to the common 
law of defamation. These changes, which are described in detail below, would 
result in intermediaries rarely being liable in defamation for third-party content. 
However, we recognize that significant reputational harm can be caused by 
content posted online and intermediaries have the capacity and flexibility to 
respond to defamation complaints in a way that courts cannot (speed, anonymity, 
jurisdiction, content takedown, user blocking, community responses, and so 
on). We therefore recommend that changes to the common law be accompanied 
by a regulatory regime of intermediary accountability. Before setting out these 
two prongs of our proposed approach, we introduce a range of intermediary 
accountability regimes from Canada and around the world which inform our 
recommendations.
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II. STATUTORY APPROACHES TO INTERMEDIARY LIABILITY
There are many ways to categorize intermediary liability models.50 They can 
be roughly broken down to six types. First, the strict liability model requires 
the monitoring of content by intermediaries, failing which they face legal 
consequences such as criminal penalties, withdrawal of business licences, and 
so on. Countries that use such a model include Thailand and China.51 Second, 
the safe harbour model provides intermediaries with conditional immunity from 
liability, better known as a notice and takedown regime. Two notable examples 
are the European Electronic Commerce Directive (ECD)52 and the American 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).53 Third, the broad immunity model 
provides what the title suggests—broad immunity to intermediaries for the 
content that is available through their services—as exemplified in section 230 
of the American Communications Decency Act (CDA).54 Fourth, the notice and 
notice model, implemented in Canada’s Copyright Act,55 imposes no liability 
risk on intermediaries, rather a risk of a fine for failure to pass on a notice of 
infringement to a user. Fifth, the generalist model does not provide special 
intermediary liability rules. Rather, a case is assessed against general civil and 
criminal laws on contributory or vicarious liability.56 Last, a human rights model, 
50. Article 19, Internet Intermediaries: Dilemma of Liability (London: Free World Centre, August 
2013) at 7, online (pdf ): <www.article19.org/data/files/Intermediaries_ENGLISH.pdf> 
[perma.cc/AR4P-5BB5] [Article 19]. Article 19 created three categories, but we suggest there 
are six because of Canada’s notice and notice system, which is the type of liability regime 
Article 19 recommends in the report. See also Association of Progressive Communications, 
“Frequently asked questions on internet intermediary liability” (May 2014), online: <www.
apc.org/en/pubs/apc%E2%80%99s-frequently-asked-questions-internet-intermed> [perma.
cc/235R-JFNY] (last accessed: 20 October 2018) [APC] (discussing the increase in explicitly 
human-rights based models).
51. Ibid at 7.
52. ECD, supra note 30.
53. Pub L No 105-304, § 512, 112 Stat 2860 at 2877 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 USC §§ 
512, 1201-205, 1301-32; 28 USC § 4001 (1998)) [DMCA]. See also Article 19, supra note 
50 at 7 (for framing of approaches).
54. CDA, supra note 34.
55. RSC 1985, c C-42, as amended by Copyright Modernization Act, 2012, c 20 [Copyright Act]. 
The notice and notice provisions are sections 41.25-41.27.
56. APC, supra note 50.
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evident in Brazil’s Marco Civil57 and civil society’s Manila Principles,58 explicitly 
designs intermediary liability rules that reflect human rights principles.
Four of these models of liability are particularly relevant to this article and 
explored in more detail: safe harbour, broad immunity, notice and notice, and 
human rights-based.
A. SAFE HARBOUR
The safe harbour model provides intermediaries with conditional immunity from 
liability. This is better known as the NTD regime wherein an intermediary is 
provided a safe harbour from liability as long as it removes content or disables 
access to content that is on the list of unlawful material to be taken down. 
An example of a safe harbour model is Europe’s ECD.59 The ECD provides broad 
immunity for conduits (e.g., ISPs) and to a lesser extent intermediaries that cache 
content, but requires hosts (e.g., social networking providers) to disable access to 
content upon actual knowledge or awareness that it is unlawful.60 This is known 
as the horizontal approach, because it applies to multiple causes of action, which 
is contrasted with the American vertical approach where NTD is only required 
in the case of copyright infringement under the DMCA.61
Typically, in safe harbour models, intermediaries are encouraged to address 
unlawful content with technical solutions, corporate social responsibility or similar 
codes of practice. For example, in the USA, a memorandum of understanding 
was created between telecommunications companies and Hollywood studios 
to address online piracy.62 The current push in the European Union is for 
57. See Presidência da República Casa Civil Subchefia para Assuntos Jurídicos [Presidency of 
the Republic, Civil House, Legal Affairs Subsection], Brasília, 23 April 2014, Marco Civil 
da Internet [Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet] (2014), Law 12.965 (Brazil), 
online: <pensando.mj.gov.br/marcocivil/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2015/03/bill-12965.
pdf> [perma.cc/PNY4-RPZF].
58. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability (24 
March 2015), online: <www.manilaprinciples.org/principles> [perma.cc/R8JW-83JA] 
[Manila Principles].
59. ECD, supra note 30.
60. Ibid, arts 12-14. Note this paper does not examine the separate data protection regime and 
its impact on intermediaries’ legal obligations. See generally Bart van der Sloot, “Welcome to 
the Jungle: the Liability of Internet Intermediaries for Privacy Violations” (2015) 6 J Intell 
Prop Inf Tech & Electronic Com L 211 (for a comparison of approaches to intermediary 
liability between data protection, human rights and e-commerce regimes for privacy).
61. DMCA, supra note 53, s 512; Article 19, supra note 50 at 7 (for horizontal versus 
vertical description).
62. Article 19, supra note 50 at 7, n 17.
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companies to more rapidly take down extremist content, warning that regulation 
is forthcoming if companies fail to self-regulate more effectively.63
The main ECD Article of controversy (and relevance to this article) is Article 
14’s conditional safe harbour for hosts, meaning intermediaries in their capacity 
of storing third-party content. A typical host is a social networking provider, 
such as Facebook, Twitter, or Reddit, which does not tend to create content (as 
compared to newspapers and broadcasters) but is a platform for users to post 
content. Article 14 does not immunize a host from liability for any other services 
it provides, such as content creation. Based on Article 14, an intermediary can 
lose its safe harbour not only when it has actual knowledge it is hosting unlawful 
content and fails to disable access to it, but if it is “aware of facts or circumstances 
from which the illegal activity or information is apparent.”64
Article 14 is controversial and illustrates that a seemingly simple safe harbour 
regime is complicated to deploy.65 Key points of uncertainty are the meaning 
of knowledge and notice. What must be known by the intermediary to trigger 
obligations under Article 14? What kind of notice to an intermediary fixes it with 
knowledge that it is hosting unlawful content? In the case of defamation, does a 
notice to Facebook that it is hosting defamatory content fix it with knowledge 
for the purpose of Article 14? Or is it when a representative from Facebook has 
assessed the content to make a determination of whether it is defamatory?
While actual knowledge is evident where an intermediary is provided with 
a court order, it is less clear when an intermediary has “general awareness” that 
63. Samuel Gibbs, “EU gives Facebook and Google three months to tackle extremist content,” 
The Guardian, (1 March 2018), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/01/
eu-facebook-google-youtube-twitter-extremist-content> [perma.cc/3TB8-WRZ5]. The 
European Commission confirmed it would be encouraging voluntary action on the part of 
platforms. See EC, Commission, Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market Opportunities 
and Challenges for Europe, (Brussels: COM, 25 May 2016) at 8.
64. ECD, supra note 30, art 14.
65. Article 19, supra note 50. There are numerous scholarly articles examining intermediary 
liability in Europe and the UK. See e.g. Daithí Mac Síthigh, “The Fragmentation of 
Intermediary Liability in the UK” (2013) 8 J Intell Prop L & Prac 521; Uta Kohl, “The rise 
and rise of online intermediaries in the governance of the Internet and beyond – connectivity 
intermediaries” (2012) 26 Intl Rev L Comp & Tech 185; Uta Kohl, “Google: the rise and 
rise of online intermediaries in the governance of the Internet and beyond (Part 2)” (2013) 
21 Intl JL & IT 187; Christina Angelopoulos and Stijn Smet, “Notice-and-fair-balance: 
how to reach a compromise between fundamental rights in European intermediary liability” 
(2016) 8 J Media L 266.
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it is hosting illegal content.66 Further, the relevant knowledge under Article 
14 is as to unlawfulness (“knowledge of illegal activity or information”).67 
Thus, in a defamation context, this means it is insufficient to have knowledge 
something is prima facie defamatory, as it might be saved by one of the defences 
such as truth or qualified privilege. Rather, knowledge must be that the content 
is actionable in the sense that there are no reasonably available defences.68
In a UK context, this means that the threshold for knowledge is higher in 
Regulation 19 of the E-Commerce Regulations,69 which implements the ECD, 
than under section 1 of the Defamation Act 1996.70 Section 1 codifies an innocent 
dissemination defence. Knowledge is tied to publication of a defamatory 
statement rather than the narrower concept of unlawfulness in the ECD:
In defamation proceedings a person has a defence if he shows that –
(a) he was not the author, editor or publisher of the statement complained of,
(b) he took reasonable care in relation to its publication, and
(c) he did not know, and had no reason to believe, that what he did caused or 
contributed to the publication of a defamatory statement.71
Further, as Michael Deturbide criticizes, section 1 creates a catch-22 regarding 
monitoring. If you do not monitor you may not be taking reasonable care, but if 
you do monitor, you may have knowledge or perhaps should have knowledge.72
The ECD is silent as to the content of notices, although state-level legislation 
can provide more detail.73 Rights holders complain that the detail required in 
notices is excessive, while intermediaries complain that often notices are not 
detailed enough for them to assess the legality of content.74 In Davison v Habeeb 
& Ors,75 the England and Wales High Court held that in the face of conflicting 
66. See three interpretations set out in EC, Commission, Online services, including e-commerce, 
in the Single Market: Accompanying the document, (Brussels: SEC, 2011) at 33 [2011 
Communication].
67. ECD, supra note 30, art 14.
68. Riordan, supra note 30 at 12.131.
69. The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/2013, 
s 19 [E-Commerce Regulations].
70. (UK) c 31, s 1 [Defamation Act]. See generally Riordan, supra note 30 at 
paras 12.130-12.133.
71. Defamation Act, supra note 70.
72. Michael Deturbide, “Liability of ISPs for Defamation in the US and Britain: Same 
Competing Interests, Different Responses” (2000) 3 J Info L & Tech.
73. See E-Commerce Regulations, supra note 69, s 22.
74. 2011 Communication, supra note 66 at 43.
75. Davison v Habeeb & Ors, [2011] EWHC 3031 (QB).
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claims from the claimant and those that published the information, Google, in its 
capacity as owner of Blogger, did not have notice. However, Google might be 
found to have notice if the claim were sufficiently well-defined and substantiated, 
and there had been no attempt to defend.76
The DMCA is more detailed than the ECD in defining the NTD rules.77 
Section 512 of the DMCA provides a safe harbour to service providers for 
copyright-infringing content as long as certain conditions are met. Annemarie 
Bridy and Daphne Keller describe it as a hybrid system with defined rules 
(NTD) as well as standards (red flag), the latter aiming to prompt social and 
moral responsibility.78 They criticize the inclusion of standards in the DMCA 
for creating uncertainty.79 The question for Canadian law reform is whether to 
prioritize certainty of rules, or whether there is tolerance of uncertainty in the 
hopes of prompting intermediaries to regulate content in socially responsible ways.
The DMCA carves an interesting path whereby detailed rules provide an 
element of certainty missing from the ECD regime, but other provisions balance 
the risk of over-compliance (i.e., taking down lawful content) by intermediaries. 
The DMCA operates in a similar way to the ECD: When a copyright infringement 
claim is made, a service provider must act promptly to remove the offending 
content.80 However, the DMCA provides detailed notification requirements,81 
including a good faith clause82 and put back procedure.83 Bridy and Keller argue 
that these provisions help minimize the risk of over-takedown with the regime.84 
Good faith clauses and counter-notices (challenging the legitimacy of a notice 
of complaint) have been suggested to reform the ECD.85 Some EU member 
states require counter-notices, although they are not popular with rights holders 
or ISPs, because they are viewed as making NTD slow, burdensome and less 
76. Ibid.
77. Note that some EU Member States have legislated the content of such notices, but there 
is no uniformity. See 2011 Communication, supra note 66 at 39-46. See also E-Commerce 
Regulations, supra note 69.
78. Annemarie Bridy & Daphne Keller, “U.S. Copyright Office Section 512 Study: Comments 
in Response to Notice of Inquiry,” Legislative Comment on 17 USC § 512 at 35-36, online: 
<papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2757197> [perma.cc/NF9F-NMW9].
79. Ibid.
80. DMCA, supra note 53, § 512(c)(C).
81. Ibid, § 512(c)(3).
82. Ibid, § 512(f ).
83. Ibid, § 512(g)(2)-(3).
84. Bridy & Keller, supra note 78 at 15-16.
85. 2011 Communication, supra note 66 at 43-45.
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effective.86 Further, a recent study suggests that the counter-notice procedure is 
rarely used under the DMCA.87 It is unclear whether user behaviour would be 
the same for defamation disputes.
The strongest criticism of both the ECD and the DMCA is that they are 
easily abused. There is minimal motivation for an intermediary to dispute a claim, 
because there is a risk of liability for refusing NTD. Bridy and Keller document 
various studies showing over-removal under the DMCA’s NTD regime.88 Studies 
in Europe show similar tendencies under the ECD.89
The United Kingdom’s Defamation Act 201390 goes further in immunizing 
intermediaries than the ECD. Section 5 applies to “operators of websites” and 
creates a defence in relation to third-party content. It applies unless:
(a) it was not possible for the claimant to identify the person who posted the 
statement,
(b) the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint in relation to the statement, 
and
(c) the operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint in accordance with any 
provision contained in regulations.91
This effectively negates liability unless and until notice is received. Even then 
there is immunity if the person who posted the statement is identifiable. While 
this addresses some of the abuse inherent in NTD regimes, for reasons set out 
below, we do not think that liability should depend on whether other publishers 
can be identified.
86. Ibid at 43-44.
87. Jennifer M Urban, Joe Karaganis & Brianna Schofield, “Notice and Takedown in 
Everyday Practice” online: (2017) UC Berkeley Pub L Research Paper Series, <ssrn.com/
abstract=2755628> [perma.cc/77X4-S2CM].
88. Bridy & Keller, supra note 78 at 23, 44, Appendix B. See also Daphne 
Keller, “Empirical Evidence of ‘Over-Removal’ by Internet Companies under 
Intermediary Liability Laws” (12 October 2015), Stanford Center for Internet 
and Society (blog), online: <www.cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/
empirical-evidence-over-removal-internet-companies-under-intermediary-liability-laws>.
89. See e.g. Christian Ahlert et al, How ‘Liberty’ Disappeared from Cyberspace: The Mystery Shopper 
Tests Internet Content Regulation (2014) [unpublished, archived at University of Oxford, 
Programme in Comparative Media Law and Policy (PCMLP) at the Centre for Socio-Legal 
Studies], online (pdf ): <pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/liberty.pdf> 
[perma.cc/ZCK2-DD8A].
90. (UK), c 26 [Defamation Act 2013].
91. Ibid, s 5(3).
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B. BROAD IMMUNITY
Another option for law reform, which avoids some of the uncertainty and 
confusion evident with the safe harbour model, is to adopt a broad immunity 
similar to CDA section 230.92 As David Ardia describes, section 230 provides 
“breathing space”93 to intermediaries, which is arguably partly responsible for 
the rich interactive space we know on the internet.94 However, commitment 
to this breathing space has been tested in recent years as online abuse becomes 
increasingly difficult to manage.
Section 230 provides immunity to an “interactive computer service” (ICS),95 
which generally refers to three types of intermediaries: communication conduits 
(e.g. ISPs), hosts (e.g. social networking providers) and search providers.96 
It modifies the common law of intermediary liability by legislating that an ICS is 
not “the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.”97 The only exception is federal criminal, communications, 
privacy, and intellectual property matters (thus we turn to the safe harbour 
model under the DMCA for copyright infringement).98 In the area of defamation 
law, the effect of section 230 is to make an ICS largely immune from liability 
for third-party content. As of 2010, 17.2 percent of section 230 claims were 
for allegedly defamatory content, and two-thirds of cases were pre-emptively 
dismissed pursuant to section 230.99
While the story of section 230 is not entirely clear,100 one of the purposes of 
passing section 230 was to overturn Stratton Oakmont, Inc v Prodigy Services Co 
(Stratton),101 which created a greater liability risk to hosts of third-party content 
that exercised responsibility by editing, moderating, or controlling content. 
Stratton, in effect, disincentivized self-regulation by intermediaries.102 This has 
92. CDA, supra note 34.
93. David S Ardia, “Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act” (2010) 43 
Loy LA L Rev 373 at 494.
94. See Danielle Citron, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2014) at 170-72.
95. CDA, supra note 34 at s 230(f )(2).
96. Ardia, supra note 93 at 432.
97. CDA, supra note 34 at s 230(c)(1).
98. Ibid, s 230(e).
99. Ardia, supra note 93 at 429, 481.
100. See ibid at 409-11 (history of CDA).
101. 24 Media L Rep 1126 (NY Sup Ct 1995).
102. Ardia, supra note 93 at 410; see also Citron, supra note 92 at 170-72.
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certainly been the dominant criticism of the European model.103 A goal of section 
230, therefore, was to provide immunity to intermediaries while at the same time 
encouraging corporate social responsibility. The question is whether a section 
230 type immunity provision is appropriate in a Canadian context.
Legal interpretation of section 230 is relatively stable:104 Once an intermediary 
is notified of unlawful content, even if it has knowledge the content is untrue, 
it has no obligation to remove it.105 Traditional editorial functions, such as 
screening for unlawful or otherwise objectionable content, removing content, 
editing content, such as to remove obscenities, do not risk the immunity under 
section 230.106 The immunity applies even when the author of the content asks 
for it to be removed and the intermediary refuses.107
However, even a broad immunity model like section 230 is plagued with 
interpretive woes at the outer edges. The boundaries of liability for mixed-use 
sites are less clear, although courts are largely guided by the material contribution 
test articulated in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v Roommates.
com LLC.108 In that case the court held that an intermediary loses the section 
230 immunity if it develops the unlawful content, “referring not merely to 
augmenting the content generally, but to materially contributing to its alleged 
unlawfulness.”109
The key flaw of section 230, however, is that it is questionable whether it 
has prompted the kind of self-regulation the legislators intended and a swathe 
103. Supra note 89 at 7-8, 11- 12 (a seminal article on this point).
104. See e.g. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub L No 
115-164, 132 Stat 1253 (2018). It amends s 230 and might potentially have broader 
implications to the liability exceptions for intermediaries. However, this analysis is focused 
on historical interpretation of s 230. Further, there have been recent challenges to s 230. See 
e.g. Eric Goldman, “WTF is Going on with Section 230?–Cross v. Facebook” (7 June 2016), 
Technology and Marketing Law (blog), online: <blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2016/06/
wtf-is-going-on-with-section-230-cross-v-facebook.htm> [perma.cc/2ERJ-52KY].
105. See Zeran v America Online, Inc, 129 F (3d) 327 (4th Cir 1997), leave to appeal to USSC 
refused, 524 US 937 (1998) [Zeran]. See also Ardia, supra note 93 at 465. See also Brian 
Holland, “In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: Facilitating Communities 
of Modified Exceptionalism” (2008) 56 Kan L Rev 369 at 370-376 (discussion of 
expansion of s 230).
106. Ardia, supra note 93 at 462.
107. Ibid at 466, citing Global Royalties Ltd v XCentric Ventures LLC, 544 F Supp (2d) 
929 (D Ariz 2008).
108. 521 F (3d) 1157 (9th Cir 2007) [Fair Housing Council]. See e.g. FTC v Accusearch, Inc, 570 F 
(3d) 1187 (10th Cir 2009) (for application of same principle).
109. Fair Housing Council, supra note 108 at 3462.
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of harmful speech continues to be published undeterred and un-remedied.110 
This is particularly relevant in the area of defamation law. For example, in Jones v 
Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC,111 Sarah Jones, a Cincinnati Bengals 
cheerleader, unsuccessfully sued the website, theDirty.com, for photos posted on 
the site and allegations of promiscuity, which affected her reputation as a teacher 
and cheerleader, and in her community.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky attempted to 
soften the hardship of section 230 for defamation claimants by holding that 
intermediaries do not benefit from section 230 when they encourage the 
development of unlawful content.112 However, this was overturned by the 
Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit, which confirmed that encouragement 
and/or facilitation are insufficient to impose liability. The court reasoned that 
there is a crucial distinction between making content available, as traditional 
publishers do, and “responsibility for what makes the displayed content illegal or 
actionable.”113 Under the District Court’s approach, websites such as consumer 
review sites would be vulnerable to the “hecklers’ veto,”114 meaning complainants 
threatening to sue an intermediary to suppress unwanted speech, which results in 
the intermediary choosing between removing content or risking liability.
Arguably, at the time section 230 was passed, it “provided much needed 
clarity for intermediaries,”115 although perhaps even then section 230 was “based 
on a simplistic and utopian version of the internet.”116 Regardless, the playing 
field has changed. It is questionable whether intermediaries continue to need 
these kinds of protections.117 One line of argument is that intermediaries have the 
capacity to regulate and a failure to impose liability means illegality is not being 
efficiently discovered or deterred.118 Most proposals to amend section 230 are 
110. Ryan Gerdes, “Scaling Back § 230 Immunity: Why the Communications Decency Act 
should Take a Page from the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s Service Provider Immunity 
Playbook” (2012) 60 Drake L Rev 653 at 667. Holland, supra note 105 at 392-393.
111. 755 F (3d) 398 (6th Cir 2014) [Jones].
112. Jones v Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 965 F Supp (2d) 818 (ED Kent 
2013) at 821-22.
113. Jones, supra note 111 at 20.
114. Ibid at 21-24.
115. Ardia, supra note 93 at 411.
116. Gerdes, supra note 110 at 667, n 116, quoting Ali Grace Zieglowsky, “Immoral Immunity: 
Using a Totality of the Circumstances Approach to Narrow the Scope of Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act” (2010) 61 Hastings LJ 1307 at 1313-14.
117. See Gerdes, supra note 110 at 667-68. See also Holland, supra note 105 at 392.
118. See discussion in Holland, supra note 105 at 391.
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tweaks which, for example, target “the very worst actors”119 or create an exception 
for encouraging the posting of unlawful content.120 Others inch closer to an ECD 
framework, such as a proposed exception to section 230 where the ISP is aware of 
information and has reasonable knowledge that it is defamatory.121
The question is how to target harmful speech without targeting the 
hecklers and without incentivizing the removal of all content complained 
about. The recommendations in this article seek to pave a middle-path between 
the ECD and CDA.
C. NOTICE AND NOTICE
The third model is notice and notice, which finds support among Civil Society 
organizations such as Article 19.122 Thus far, Canada’s Copyright Act123 is the only 
implementation of this model in the world. The provisions came into effect in 
January, 2015, although notice and notice operated informally as a voluntary 
industry practice for the previous decade.124 Pursuant to the Copyright Act, 
a copyright holder can send a notice of alleged copyright infringement to a 
user by sending it to the ISP. The ISP is required to electronically forward the 
notice to the user linked with the IP address mentioned in the notice.125 The 
risk to the intermediary for failure to forward the notice is statutory damages—
effectively a fine—of $5,000–$10,000.126 This means that a rights holder’s 
only option, after sending the notice, is a traditional action against the user for 
copyright infringement.
The purpose of the notice provisions is educational—to discourage copyright 
infringement.127 Notices can be sent to intermediaries that provide a connection 
to the internet (e.g., an ISP), storage services, or to information location tools 
(e.g., search engines).128 In practice the notices are largely sent to ISPs. Search 
providers have no obligation to forward notices. Rather, if a search provider is 
119. Citron, supra note 94 at 177.
120. Gerdes, supra note 110 at 672-75.
121. Ibid at 674-675.
122. Article 19, supra note 50.
123. Copyright Act, supra note 55.
124. Ibid. See also Copyright Modernization Act, supra note 55. See Government of Canada, Office 
of Consumer Affairs, Notice and Notice Regime, online: <www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/oca-bc.nsf/eng/
ca02920.html> [perma.cc/VWZ3-NY9N] [Office of Consumer Affairs].
125. Copyright Act, supra note 55, s 41.26(1)(a).
126. Ibid, s 41.26(3).
127. Office of Consumer Affairs, supra note 124.
128. Copyright Act, supra note 55, ss 41.25(1) and 41.25(2).
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notified that content has been removed from the source, the safe harbour only 
applies for thirty days from the date of notice.129
We can learn from the flaws in how Canada executed this system. First, 
processing these notices can be burdensome for ISPs. For example, Teksavvy 
processes about five thousand notices per day.130 The main problem with the 
current system is that, at the time the relevant provisions came into force, the 
Copyright Act contained no mandatory criteria for the content of the notices. The 
government contemplated enacting regulations to provide more detail regarding 
the notices. Indeed, Industry Canada and various ISPs warned that a template 
was needed to avoid abuse by rights holders, but the government chose not to 
enact specific rules.131 This resulted in avoidable uncertainty, confusion, and 
abuse. For example, there is a cap on damages for non-commercial infringement 
of between $100 and $5000.132 When the notice system first was in place, one 
rights holder, RightsCorp, sent letters to users stating that they could be liable 
for $150,000 and/or have their internet access suspended, neither of which is 
provided for in Canadian law.133
To combat the problem, Industry Canada and the Office of Consumer 
Affairs posted information online for users explaining the system.134 Michael 
129. Ibid, s 41.27.
130. Claire Brownell, “Pirates in your neighbourhood: How new online copyright infringement 
laws are affecting Canadians one year later,” Financial Post (12 February 2016), online: 
<business.financialpost.com/fp-tech-desk/pirates-in-your-neighbourhood-how-new-
online-copyright-infringement-laws-are-affecting-canadians-one-year-later> [perma.
cc/PU5K-AWMC] (Teksavvy reported that the software system cost $500,000 and 
administration over the first-year cost $100,000).
131. Michael Geist, “Canada’s Copyright Notice Fiasco: Why Industry Minister James Moore 
Bears Some Responsibility” (12 January 2015), online: <www.michaelgeist.ca/2015/01/
canadas-copyright-notice-fiasco-industry-minister-james-moore-bears-responsibility> 
[perma.cc/BYR8-9DTT].
132. Copyright Act, supra note 55, s 38.1.
133. See discussion Michael Geist, “Rightscorp and BMG Exploiting Copyright 
Notice-and-Notice System: Citing False Legal Information in Payment Demands” 
(8 January 2015), Michael Geist (blog), online: <www.michaelgeist.ca/2015/01/
rightscorp-bmg-exploiting-copyright-notice-notice-system-citing-false-legal-information-
payment-demands> [perma.cc/E4SE-G2WS]. See also “University of Manitoba students 
receive ‘extortion’ letters over illegal downloads” (16 September 2016), CBC, online: <www.
cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/copyright-letters-university-of-manitoba-1.3757554> 
[perma.cc/2SJ2-GBMV].
134. See Office of Consumer Affairs, supra note 124.
(2018) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL136
Geist summarized the various suggestions that have been made to fix it.135  First, 
there should be a fee for rights holders to file a notice. Government was asked to 
impose a fee on rights holders, but chose not to, and so the cost will be likely borne 
by users through higher fees. Second, there should be sanctions for misleading 
or false demands. Recall that the DMCA requires NTD requests to include a 
statement that the notice is being made in good faith. Third, ISPs should have 
discretion to refuse to forward notices, if the content of the notices is inaccurate 
or misleading. And finally, there should be a prohibition on settlement demands.
Given these recommendations for improving the system, the notice and notice 
regime is a unique middle ground between the ECD and CDA. Its suitability in 
the context of defamation claims is explored in the recommendations section.
D. HUMAN RIGHTS
Regulatory models such as the CDA (broad immunity) and ECD (safe harbour) 
were designed before international organizations paid much attention to the 
issue of intermediary liability. However, since approximately 2011, intermediary 
liability has been the subject of increasing scrutiny for its compliance with 
international human rights principles.
A theme in international human rights work is that restriction of internet 
content should comply with human rights principles. Thus, the Human Rights 
Council stated that any restriction on access to internet-based content, such 
as websites and blogs, must comply with Article 19(3) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, namely it must be prescribed by law in 
pursuit of a legitimate aim, and necessary to respect others’ rights or reputation 
or for national security or public order.136
Crafting a human rights-compliant intermediary framework that narrowly 
targets unlawful content is tricky business. On the one hand, intermediaries 
have the capacity to redress or minimize harm by removing offending content. 
On the other hand, such intermediaries are vulnerable to being proxy censors 
135. Michael Geist, “Misuse of Canada’s Copyright Notice System Continues: U.S. Firm Sending 
Thousands of Notices With Settlement Demands” (5 March 2015), Michael Geist (blog), 
online: <www.michaelgeist.ca/2015/03/misuse-canadas-copyright-notice-system-continues-
u-s-firm-sending-thousands-notices-settlement-demands> [perma.cc/6EEH-LXP8].
136. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, General Comment No. 34, OHCHR, 
102nd Sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011) at paras 21, 43 (interpreting and applying the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (GA Res 2200A (XXI), UNGAOR, 21st 
Sess, Supp No 14668, UN Doc A/6546 (1966), art 19) [HRC 2011].
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for government137 or other actors,138 imbued with power over the right to free 
speech that is inappropriate for the private sector. Intermediary liability in this 
context raises the further complicating issue of the responsibilities of businesses 
in deploying mechanisms that balance defamation and free speech, and the 
obligations of government in ensuring this balance is achieved.139 In this respect, 
the United Nations Guiding Principles provide a framework for state obligations 
to protect human rights, businesses obligations to respect human rights and the 
right of those affected to have access to a remedial mechanism.140
Commentary on the role of intermediaries and human rights tends to focus 
on three things: That intermediaries should not be liable for content created by 
others; that there should be no obligation to monitor users; and general concern 
about extra-judicial content takedown.141 The former special rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of expression, Frank La Rue, 
recommended the following when NTD is deployed:
To avoid infringing the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy 
of Internet users, the Special Rapporteur recommends intermediaries to: only 
implement restrictions to these rights after judicial intervention; be transparent to 
the user involved about measures taken, and where applicable to the wider public; 
provide, if possible, forewarning to users before the implementation of restrictive 
measures; and minimize the impact of restrictions strictly to the content involved. 
Finally, there must be effective remedies for affected users, including the possibility 
137. Seth F Kreimer, “Censorship by Proxy: First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the 
Problem of the Weakest Link” (2006) 155 U Pa L Rev 11.
138. See discussion in Emily B Laidlaw, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace: Gatekeepers, Human 
Rights and Corporate Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 2015) [Laidlaw, 
Regulating Speech].
139. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding principles 
on business and human rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘protect, respect and remedy’ 
framework, OHCHR, 2011, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 [Guiding Principles]. Later endorsed 
by Human Rights Council, Human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, HRC Res 17/4, OHCHR, 17th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4 (2011).
140. Ibid.
141. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression et al, Joint 
Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet, (Washington DC: OSCE, June 2011) 
at 2, online: <www.osce.org/fom/78309> [perma.cc/RD5P-ZT6G]; Frank La Rue, Report 
of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion 
and expression, UNHRC, 17th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 (2011) at para 43; David 
Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression, UNHRC, 32nd Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/32/38 (2016) at para 
2 [Report of the Special Rapporteur]; David Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, UNHRC, 38th Sess, 
UN Doc A/HRC/38/35 (2018) [Kaye 2018].
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of appeal through the procedures provided by the intermediary and by a competent 
judicial authority.142
Two frameworks seek to take a rights-based approach (meaning based on 
international human rights standards) to regulating intermediaries. First, Brazil’s 
Marco Civil143 (known in internet governance circles as the “constitution for 
the internet”144) reflects human rights principles by unshackling host awareness 
or knowledge that it is hosting unlawful content from the liability framework. 
Rather, the risk of liability is only triggered by failure to comply with a court 
order. In this way, it is consistent with Frank La Rue’s recommendation that 
content takedown should only be deployed pursuant to a court order. Civil Society 
organization Article 19 and the Manila Principles propose similar limitations on 
intermediary liability.145
The Manila Principles (“Principles”) are a set of six principles created by civil 
society organizations from around the world.146 The focus of the Principles is best 
practices rather than certainty of rules.147 The six principles summarized are:
Intermediaries should be shielded from liability for third-party content.
Content must not be required to be restricted without an order by a judicial 
authority.
Requests for restrictions of content must be clear, be unambiguous, and follow due 
process.
Laws and content restriction orders and practices must comply with the tests of 
necessity and proportionality.
Laws and content restriction policies and practices must respect due process.
Transparency and accountability must be built into laws and content restriction 
policies and practices.148
The Principles are influential. For example, Annemarie Bridy and Daphne 
Keller used it as the basis for recommendations to reform the DMCA NTD 
regime.149 The Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right 
142. La Rue, supra note 141 at para 47.
143. Marco Civil, supra note 57.
144. Nicolo Zingales, “The Brazilian approach to internet intermediary liability: blueprint for a 
global regime?” (2015) 4 Internet Pol’y Rev 1.
145. See Article 19, supra note 50.
146. Manila Principles, supra 58.
147. Ibid, Introduction.
148. Ibid.
149. Bridy & Keller, supra note 78 at 24-25.
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to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, in his report on content 
moderation, stated that the Principles “identify essential principles that should 
guide any intermediary liability framework.”150
A consistent recommendation in the above models and literature is that 
content should only be restricted via court order. It would be difficult to implement 
this for defamation disputes, which tend to be high volume, low value and legally 
complex. Courts are slow, the volume of applications high, or the process might 
pose a barrier to access to justice for claimants without the legal knowledge or 
finances to make an application. In the case of Marco Civil, those concerns are 
partly addressed through Article 21, which provides for a fast-track process for 
non-consensual distribution of intimate images, known as revenge pornography. 
A fast-track option does not apply seamlessly to a defamation context, because 
it involves issues more complex than identifying when an image is intimate and 
distributed without consent.
III. RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE LAW
We recommend a bespoke two-part approach that will achieve a balance we think 
is best suited to Canada. We set out the approach in three parts. First, we are 
explicit about the principles that guide our recommendations. Second, we describe 
proposed changes to the law of defamation. Third, we set out a novel regulatory 
regime we call notice-and-notice-plus. The combined effect of these proposed 
changes is to impose an appropriate degree of responsibility on intermediaries 
without holding them liable as defamers for the expression of others.
A. PRINCIPLES
In this section we set out the principles and positions that guided us in making 
our recommendations. Those who do not value the same principles or weigh 
them in the way we did will obviously have different preferences for law reform.
First, we are of the view that intermediaries should not act as arbiters of what 
is defamatory. Defamation involves complex determinations of fact and law, 
and intermediaries do not have the legal expertise to make such determinations. 
Nor do they usually have a sufficient factual record on which to judge whether 
something is defamatory. They often have received a complaint and nothing 
more. This may be enough information where it is alleged that expression is 
offensive or abusive, but whether it is defamatory (or false) is more complicated. 
150. Kaye 2018, supra note 141 at para 14.
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Further, if intermediaries have to decide whether to take down expression alleged 
to be defamatory, the incentive will be for them to over-remove, since that is 
cheaper than fighting to defend expression.151 This is evident in the safe harbour 
regimes analysed above, with studies showing over-removal under both the ECD 
and DMCA.152 As Daphne Keller observes:
[T]he easiest, cheapest, and most risk-avoidant path for any technical intermediary 
is simply to process a removal request and not question its validity. A company that 
takes an “if in doubt, take it down” approach to requests may simply be a rational 
economic actor.153
Furthermore, intermediaries tend not to be transparent in their takedown 
decisions, which also militates against them being the arbiters of what is 
defamatory.154 Those of us interested in free expression cannot scrutinize the 
basis for decisions the intermediary is making, and which may have the effect of 
denying public access to expression.
Second, we are of the view that intermediaries have a role in mediating 
removal requests. This is because online content can cause significant reputational 
harm, intermediaries benefit from third-party content, and intermediaries often 
have better capacity to respond to complaints than courts (due to the slow pace 
and high cost of access to justice, anonymity, jurisdictional problems, et cetera). 
Although intermediaries should not act as censors, they should have obligations 
when it comes to handling defamation complaints.
151. This point was made by the United Kingdom’s Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation 
Bill, and although the following point referred to pre-2013 English defamation law, 
it is equally true of present Canadian law: “As the law stands, far from encouraging service 
providers to foster legitimate debate in a responsible manner and removing the most extreme 
material, it encourages them to ignore any dubious material but then to remove it without 
question following a complaint.” UK, Joint Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, 
Draft Defamation Bill (Report, together with formal minutes) (London: The Stationary 
Office, 2011) at 54.
152. See Keller, supra note 88; Ahlert, Marsden & Yung, supra note 89.
153. Keller, supra note 88.
154. See “Ranking Digital Rights,” Ranking Digital Rights, online: <rankingdigitalrights.org> 
(under the leadership of Rebecca MacKinnon, they published a Corporate Accountability 
Index in 2015, 2017, and 2018) [Ranking Digital Rights].
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Third, all things being equal, laws should be technologically neutral. This 
allows them better to adapt to technological changes.155
Fourth, liability in defamation should not hinge on whether another 
defendant, such as the third-party content creator, is available to be sued. It may 
seem obvious that liability should not depend on the existence of another party 
who can be sued. However, we address this point because section 10 of the United 
Kingdom’s Defamation Act 2013 denies courts jurisdiction to hear defamation 
actions against secondary publishers unless it is “not reasonably practicable” 
to bring an action against the primary publisher. In addition, there is some 
sympathy in the case law for the view that intermediaries should perhaps be liable 
where the alternative is to deny the plaintiff any recourse at all. Justice Deschamps, 
writing in Crookes v Newton, suggests that a problem with immunizing secondary 
publishers is that it may leave plaintiffs without a remedy.156
Although leaving a plaintiff without a remedy is problematic, it is more 
so to have rules that impose liability for reasons unrelated to a defendant’s 
conduct. “Practical difficulties in bringing a claim against one person … can 
hardly justify by themselves the extension of joint and several liability to relatively 
innocent parties.”157 Liability dependent on the existence of other parties creates 
uncertainty and unfairness, in that defendants’ responsibility for third-party 
content depends on factors completely outside their control. On principle, the 
law should not encourage the pursuit of deep-pocketed but non-blameworthy 
parties simply because the alternative is to leave someone without a remedy. 
Ryan Turner noted that: “The broad definition of ‘publication’ … facilitates this 
155. See e.g. Gutnick v Dow Jones, [2002] HCA 56 at para 125. The court stated as follows:
Generally speaking, it is undesirable to express a rule of the common law in terms of a 
particular technology. Doing so presents problems where that technology is itself overtaken by 
fresh developments. It can scarcely be supposed that the full potential of the Internet has yet 
been realised. The next phase in the global distribution of information cannot be predicted. 
A legal rule expressed in terms of the Internet might very soon be out of date.
156. Crookes, supra note 2 at para 105. The court stated as follows:
“… Although I agree with my colleague that the most effective remedy for someone who has 
been defamed on line is to sue the person who created the defamatory material (para 41), 
it may not always be possible to do so in the context of the Internet. … If no remedy exists 
against ‘mere’ hyperlinkers, persons defamed on line may in many cases not be able to protect 
their reputations.”
 See also Baglow, supra note 19 at para 196.
157. See e.g. Scott, supra note 1 at 2.65.
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search for deep pockets.”158 We propose to address the problem by narrowing the 
definition of publication.
Fifth, rules should be human-rights based; namely, they should be 
prescribed by law with a legitimate aim, and comply with principles of necessity, 
proportionality, transparency, accountability and due process. This is consistent 
with recent Human Rights Council general comments and United Nations 
special rapporteur reports.159
Sixth, rules governing internet intermediaries should not stifle innovation. 
In the background of any intermediary regime, whether liability-based or 
otherwise, must be the recognition that the framework is inextricably tied 
with innovation. As Martin Husovec commented in the European intellectual 
property context:
Intermediary liability, regulated by intellectual property laws, is a type of application-
level regulation. Any allocation of responsibilities to application developers also has 
a direct impact on the future of Internet-enabled innovation. Intermediary liability 
is thus an important part of innovation policy. It sets certain incentives for behavior 
and business models. Assuming the intermediaries behave rationally, they will 
always respond to this regulation by minimizing the cost of their assistance to rights 
holders and adjusting their business models appropriately. This can be, of course, 
either good or bad depending on the incentives.160
In crafting intermediary rules, we are conscious that overly restrictive 
intermediary rules can stifle business development and, in particular, burden 
small- and medium sized companies.
Finally, rules governing internet intermediaries should encourage social 
responsibility in relation to defamatory content. In our view, this means 
incentivizing having processes in place (modeled on human rights principles) to 
manage content complaints.
158. Ryan Turner, “Internet Defamation Law and Publication by Omission: A Multijurisdictional 
Analysis” (2014) 37 UNSWLJ 34 at 61 [Turner].
159. See HRC 2011, supra note 136; Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 141. 
See also Frank La Rue, supra note 141 at para 47. In particular, we are conscious of 
the recommendations by the former special rapporteur, Frank La Rue, which include 
the following: content removal only via a court order; transparency of process and 
decisions; warning to users before restrictions are deployed, if possible; and minimization 
of restrictions.
160. Martin Husovec, “Accountable, Not Liable: Injunctions Against Intermediaries” 
(2016), [unpublished, archived at Tilburg Law and Economic Center] at 9, online: 
<www.tilburguniversity.edu/research/institutes-and-research-groups/tilec/research/
discussion-papers/2016> [perma.cc/B9E2-NDD4] [emphasis in original].
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B. CHANGES TO THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
We propose that the common law definition of publication in defamation be 
changed so as to require intent to publish specific words at the time of publication. 
This change would apply to the law of defamation as a whole, not only to cases 
involving intermediaries. As such, not only is it a technology-neutral approach, 
it is an approach that goes beyond the problem of intermediary liability. We begin 
by clarifying what this would mean. We then justify the recommended approach.
The common law has already been moving in the direction of requiring 
knowledge, as exemplified by Bunt v Tilley, which held that: “[T]here must be 
knowing involvement in the process of publication of the relevant words.”161 
Justice Abella in Crookes cited these words with approval, and Justice Deschamps’ 
concurring reasons in Crookes also suggest a narrowing of the definition of 
publication.162 However, the case law is somewhat confused and contradictory. 
Rather than modifying the concepts of publication by omission and innocent 
dissemination, we recommend a change to the definition of publication as a 
whole. Ryan Turner argues for such an approach:
[D]efamation law ought to be broken down and reconstructed so that the distinction 
between publication and innocent dissemination is obliterated. In its place should 
be a simplified cause of action based on the moral responsibility of an entity for 
the publication that does not risk peripheral actors being unnecessarily caught in 
defamation proceedings merely because they were a prima facie publisher.163
In essence, “publication” would mean conveying words with intent that 
those specific words be conveyed at the time they are conveyed. Put differently, 
publishers would have to have knowledge of specific words, knowledge that 
they are being conveyed, and control over whether they are conveyed. Thus, 
defamation would be an intentional tort, with intent relating not simply to an 
intentional act of conveyance (like selling a newspaper or clamping down the 
printing press). Rather, the intentional act would be conveying particular words.
As for whether a failure to remove content after notice should be treated as 
such an intentional act of publication, we recommend that it should not—the 
publication by omission doctrine should be abandoned.
161. Bunt, supra note 15 at 23 [emphasis in original].
162. Crookes, supra note 2 at paras 21, 88-90. Although Justice Deschamps endorses a different 
test of publication requiring a deliberate act of making content readily available, she relates 
that to a “emerging consensus” reflected in cases like Godfrey, Bunt, and MIS, which all adopt 
the “knowing involvement in the process of publication of the relevant words” approach 
(ibid at para 59).
163. Turner, supra note 158 at 55.
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An alternative proposal is to continue to allow publication by omission, but 
only on the condition that the endorsement requirement be applied rigorously. 
As demonstrated above, endorsement is generally inferred from knowledge and 
a refusal to take down. In all contexts, but especially the internet intermediary 
context, there are many reasons why a refusal to remove content does not 
indicate endorsement of that content. These include a lack of resources to deal 
with complaints, a platform’s policy of not removing certain content, a general 
commitment to free speech, or the view that it is not the appropriate role of 
intermediaries to censor online speech. Rigorous application of the endorsement 
requirement might be sufficient to justify continued use of the publication by 
omission doctrine. Nevertheless, we remain concerned that courts will continue 
too readily to infer endorsement. For that reason, we recommend eliminating the 
publication by omission doctrine entirely.
This is a more controversial recommendation than requiring knowing 
publication of specific words. However, if the defendant is not initially 
responsible for communicating the relevant words, she should not be made 
responsible for them, as a defamer, because she failed to remove them—even 
if that failure can be interpreted as endorsement. As with our recommendation 
with regard to secondary publishers, this recommendation is based both on a lack 
of blameworthiness and on the incentives the status quo creates, both of which 
are discussed below.
Others have endorsed this approach. Andrew Scott recommends that only 
primary involvement in communicating a libel should ground liability, and 
“[f ]ailure to take content down after it has been identified as problematic by 
a complainant does not amount to primary involvement in communicating a 
libel.”164 Similarly, in Ryan Turner’s view, it is problematic to ground internet 
intermediary liability in the publication by omission is doctrine:
If the Court were to return to first principles, a tension would emerge between 
the imputation of liability for defamation to the owners and operators of internet 
platforms for publication by omission and the justice-based reasoning in Emmens.165
Thus, our recommendation is that only intentional acts of conveying 
specific words, not failures to remove expression, should constitute 
publication in defamation.
Questions will inevitably arise regarding what it means to convey particular 
words intentionally. It is the role of the courts to resolve such matters. However, 
164. Scott, supra note 1 at para 2.62.
165. Turner, supra note 158 at 55.
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for greater certainty, we address the relevance of control, negligence, constructive 
intent, and automatically generated content.
Control is implicit in the concept of an intentional act of conveyance. If the 
defendant were unable to do otherwise, then she has not intentionally conveyed 
content (or the act was not voluntary, which should have the same effect). Recall, 
however, that control is insufficient: A positive act of conveying, rather than a 
failure to remove content should be required.
Content creators who intentionally disseminate their own words, and those 
who intentionally repeat others’ words, would be captured under the proposed 
intent standard. Editors, commercial publishers, or traditional secondary 
publishers who did not actually read the relevant words before participating in 
their dissemination could be dealt with in one of two ways: Either they should 
not be liable as defamers because, though they may have been careless, they did 
not intentionally take part in an act that harmed reputation. The preferable 
alternative, however, is that their liability be assessed according to traditional 
doctrines of accessory or vicarious liability. As Joachim Dietrich notes in his 
article on publication, if the scope of the publication element were narrowed, 
accessory liability could capture some of the conduct that now falls within the 
definition of publication:
[T]he very meaning of publication, as encompassing persons who ‘take part’ or 
participate in some way in the publication, appears to refer to concepts that are 
relevant to establishing liability as an accessory, that is, a person who has not 
committed the primary wrong but nonetheless was sufficiently involved in the 
commission of such a wrong by another. Importantly, an accessory is someone 
against whom the elements of the primary torts cannot be established.166
The reason that accessory liability principles have not generally been relied on 
in defamation is that: “Given the absence of any mental element other than the 
intention to communicate [in the existing law], this leaves little scope for reliance 
on accessorial liability principles in defamation law.”167 The benefit of relying 
on accessory liability, rather than a broad definition of publication, is that it is 
grounded in acts that are actually wrongful by virtue of some mental state on the 
part of the defendant and a relationship with someone who committed the tort.168
Willful blindness should, consistent with legal principles, be treated as 
intent—not carelessness. In addition, intent can be constructive, in the sense 
that where conveying particular content is substantially certain to result from the 
166. Dietrich, supra note 6 at 93-94 [emphasis in original].
167. Ibid at 95.
168. Ibid.
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defendant’s act, intent to publish will be inferred. It is important to distinguish, 
however, between constructive intent, in which intent is inferred because of 
the substantial certainty of the outcome, and constructive knowledge. In the 
defamation context, constructive knowledge is generally understood to mean 
that the defendant ought to have known the publication contained a libel. 
This is different than constructive intent in two ways: First, it relates to what 
was known about the contents rather than what was intended to be conveyed. 
Second, it is based on negligence (ought reasonably to have known) rather than 
substantial certainty. Constructive intent to convey, with its high threshold 
of substantial certainty, is an evidentiary shortcut for actual intent to convey. 
Constructive knowledge, as the courts have understood it, imposes a negligence 
standard rather than an intent standard. We recommend the higher intent 
standard for liability.
We further recommend that it be sufficient that the defendant intended 
to convey the specific words; she need not agree that they have the meaning 
attributed to them by the finder of fact. This is part of what it means to say 
that the defendant need not have known the words were defamatory. The other 
part relates to not knowing that the act constitutes a civil wrong, which is 
never a defence.
As for generating expression automatically based on third-party content, 
such as creating search engine snippets and autocompletes, we propose that this 
not be considered an intentional act of publication. This conclusion is adopted 
with some hesitation, since of all the roles intermediaries play, this one is arguably 
the closest to primary publication in the traditional sense. Nevertheless, this 
approach is recommended for the same reasons we recommend liability require 
intent and control: A lack of blameworthiness and the incentives liability would 
create to modify or remove search engine results that may not be defamatory. 
(These justifications are expanded on below.) It is important that there be 
processes for removing or amending defamatory snippets and autocompletes, 
but simply generating this content should not make a search engine a defamer.
In some ways, the proposed definition is still, in our view, too broad. 
It would capture, for example, a newsagent or librarian who reads a newspaper 
or book, becomes aware of the relevant words (although not necessarily that they 
are defamatory), and continues to sell or lend the item. Although the newsagent/
library scenario is intuitively unsatisfactory to us, we are unable to support certain 
alternative tests that would avoid this problem, such as a publication test based on 
authorship, commercial publication, being the first publisher, or endorsement. 
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Further, we take some comfort from the fact that defamation actions of this kind 
should be exceedingly rare.
It follows from the foregoing that we do not recommend adopting an 
approach like those in section 1(1) of the UK Defamation Act 1996, and section 
10 of the UK Defamation Act 2013. They focus on whether the defendant is 
an “author, editor or [commercial] publisher.” Authorship has never been the 
touchstone of publication and we are not proposing that that would change. 
And although the Act’s definition of “authorship” is broader than how that word 
is generally understood—in that it includes those who repeat content without 
being a content creator—in our view, this adds unnecessary confusion to the law.
In addition, “editor” could be interpreted to include those who monitor 
generally but have no specific prior knowledge of the defamatory words, or who 
simply have systems in place for censoring or removing content.169 Such people 
should not be treated as publishers, except under principles of accessory liability.
Therefore, rather than importing these British concepts into Canadian 
defamation law we prefer an approach to publication that requires an intent to 
publish specific content.170
We justify this approach in two ways: A lack of blameworthiness and the 
problematic incentives that broader liability creates.
First, the current definition of publication captures conduct that is arguably 
not blameworthy. By definition, secondary publishers lack knowledge or control 
over defamatory content. They either do not knowingly convey particular 
words, or they knowingly convey information but have no ability to prevent 
publication. And although the doctrines of innocent dissemination and passive 
instruments exist to protect non-blameworthy conduct, they do not go far 
enough. Passive instruments are often made publishers by omission. And the 
innocent dissemination defence is defeated by mere negligence. Thus, for example, 
a newsagent who sells a tabloid, knowing it often contains libels, but without 
knowing of specific libelous content, is arguably a publisher of that specific 
169. Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Defamation (Discussion Paper No 
161) (Edinburgh, APS Group Scotland 2016) at para 7.7, online: <www.scotlawcom.
gov.uk/files/5114/5820/6101/Discussion_Paper_on_Defamation_DP_No_161.pdf> 
[perma.cc/FKB6-9463], citing Collins, supra note 10 at para 16.13. The Scotland Law 
Commission also notes the difficulty in interpreting what “moderating” means (ibid at para 
7.38) [Scotland LC].
170. Note that although Andrew Scott recommends that Northern Ireland adopt some of the 
“author, editor and publisher” language in its laws, that must be understood in the context of 
the advantage of Northern Ireland’s laws mirroring those of the United Kingdom, all things 
being equal. See Scott, supra note 1 at para 2.74.
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libelous content. It is our view that the newsagent’s actions are insufficiently 
blameworthy to ground liability in these circumstances. Given the importance 
of protecting speech, and the potentially broad scope of the resulting liability, 
carelessness or constructive knowledge should be insufficient to justify liability 
for third-party conduct. Rather, knowledge of specific words should be necessary.
Publishing by omission is also generally not sufficiently blameworthy to 
justify liability for third-party defamatory content unless perhaps their omission 
satisfies the requirements for accessory liability. (This does not mean they should 
have no responsibility in relation to that content, as discussed in detail below.) Tort 
law imposes few positive duties to act and we are not convinced there should be 
an exception for removing third-party content. When people sue intermediaries 
on the basis of the publication by omission doctrine, we believe they are usually 
saying “you have to take it down,” not “you have defamed me.” Our proposal 
allows for the content to be removed, if appropriate to do so, without the need to 
hold the intermediary liable as a defamer.
A second justification for the changes we propose relates to the incentives the 
existing law creates. If liability in defamation can rest on a secondary publisher’s 
negligence, this raises the question of what constitutes unreasonable conduct. 
While one might think that Google is not careless for allowing defamatory 
content to be found in its search engine results, or that a news media company is 
not careless for allowing defamatory content to be found in its comments sections, 
courts have sometimes held otherwise.171 It seems inevitable that such a standard 
would incentivize intermediaries to monitor and take down content alleged 
to be defamatory since a mere failure to detect a libel, through “unreasonable” 
monitoring practices, could ground liability.
While one might think that increased monitoring and takedowns could 
only be a positive development, we strongly disagree. While monitoring and 
takedowns for compliance with terms of service may be desirable in relation to 
certain kinds of online content (child sexual abuse images, for example), in our 
view it is not appropriate for intermediaries to monitor for, and take down, 
expression alleged to be defamatory. Intermediaries are not well-positioned to 
171. Trkulja, supra note 48. In Trkulja, the court stated the following:
In any event, Google Inc’s submissions overlook the fact that in order to establish the defence 
of innocent dissemination it had to establish not only that it did not know that the matter was 
defamatory, but also that it ought not reasonably to have known of that matter and that such 
lack of knowledge was not due to any negligence on its part. The jury may well have concluded 
that Google Inc failed to establish that it ought not have reasonably known that the relevant 
matter was defamatory and/or that it had not established that any lack of knowledge on its part 
was not due to its negligence (ibid at 41).
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assess the complex factual and legal issues that determine whether third-party 
expression is defamatory. The complexity of defamation law and the need for 
evidence of what is true mean that proper and balanced determinations would be 
costly and time-consuming. It will always be cheaper and easier to remove content 
that is challenging or offensive, but perhaps true and valuable. Intermediaries will 
also tend to have little incentive to defend the speech complained of.172 Further, 
they are unlikely to make takedown decisions in a transparent way that permits 
public scrutiny.
If assigned this role, intermediaries’ response will almost inevitably be to 
remove content that is lawful as well as unlawful. The law of defamation online 
would largely be replaced by terms of service, which give corporations the right 
to decide what content is problematic, both in terms of the standards themselves 
and in terms of deciding when those standards are met. Indeed, this already 
happens with regard to most complaints regarding online content and many 
people have expressed concern about the effect of such an approach on freedom of 
expression.173 A different liability and regulatory regime might change this. Thus, 
the practical reasons against a negligence standard militate strongly against it.
The practical argument against a negligence/innocent dissemination standard 
also applies to the offline context. If librarians or newsagents can be held liable 
for their constructive knowledge or failure to monitor content, they too will have 
an incentive to censor what they lend and sell. This is a less realistic scenario 
because these librarians or newsagents are less likely to be sued in the first place 
where there is a physical publication (book, newspaper) and therefore likely a 
viable primary publisher to be sued. Nevertheless, the analogy works outside 
the intermediary context and there is no reason, in our view, to create special 
defamation rules for internet intermediaries.
The incentives created by the publication by omission doctrine are identical 
to those above (intermediaries will remove expression in a discretionary and likely 
non-transparent way because it is cheaper and easier than fighting to protect 
expression, and immunizes them from liability). If anything, the incentives are 
clearer in the publication by omission context because once there is knowledge, 
a refusal to take down expression is readily interpreted as endorsement and grounds 
liability. There is no need to debate whether conduct is unreasonable. Abolishing 
the publication by omission doctrine therefore protects speech and promotes the 
principle that intermediaries should not be the arbiters of what is defamatory.
172. See Scott, supra note 1 at 2.59.
173. See e.g. Jacquelyn E Fradette, “Online Terms of Service: A Shield for First Amendment 
Scrutiny of Government Action” (2013) 89 Notre Dame L Rev 947 at 948-49.
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Changing the meaning of the publication element could be accomplished 
through the common law or through statute. The United Kingdom, for example, 
has modified its common law definitions of publication by statute.174 We believe 
a statutory change to the common law is quicker and easier to justify. Also, 
given that our recommendations are in two parts, the second of which must 
be statutory, it may make sense for the changes both to be made by statute. 
In the absence of political interest in making the change, however, judges could 
continue narrowing the definition of publication in defamation.
C. NOTICE-AND-NOTICE-PLUS: A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Taking into account our recommendation that the common law of defamation 
should be modified so that secondary publishers are not considered publishers 
of defamatory content, we recommend that procedures be codified for handling 
defamation complaints, which we call notice-and-notice-plus. They draw from 
the notice and notice framework under the Copyright Act and the plus is (a) 
lessons learned from deployment of notice and notice for copyright infringement 
and (b) the need for something more in the defamation context.
We propose that intermediaries be required to pass along a notice of complaint 
to the third-party content creator. The form of the notice requests a response 
setting out some form of justification for the impugned speech. If such a response 
is received, the intermediary will take no further steps and the complainant would 
have to get a court order for removal. If, however, no response is received, the 
intermediary must take down the impugned content. If the intermediary fails to 
comply with its obligations to pass on notice or to take down content, it would 
face regulatory fines rather than liability in defamation.
We justify our recommendations on the basis of the following. Drawing 
from the principles above, it is inappropriate, at least in the defamation context, 
for intermediaries to act in the quasi-judicial role of assessing the legality of 
content on its services (outside the context of its own terms of service). NTD, 
as it is currently crafted under the ECD, for example, imposes an enormous 
burden on intermediaries, creates a privatized censorship role, is uncertain as to 
the knowledge requirement to trigger obligations, and results in over-removal of 
content. A notice and notice approach removes intermediaries from being arbiters 
of what is defamatory (and questions about knowledge), rather channeling 
intermediaries in the role they more accurately play—internet middlemen.
174. Defamation Act 2013, supra note 90, s 15.
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We reject a section 230 CDA broad immunity defence as inappropriate in 
a Canadian context. There is no evidence that section 230 spurred the kinds of 
social responsibility it was supposed to. Rather, it effectively shields sites that 
host defamatory content, even in situations where the website owner knows it 
is hosting defamatory content and chooses not to remove it.175 Introducing a 
section 230 defence would be out-of-step with the balance between free speech 
and reputation in Canada, even taking into account the bolstering of free speech 
in recent cases such as Crookes v Newton,176 Grant v Torstar,177 and WIC Radio 
Ltd v Simpson.178
That said, in our view notice and notice under the Copyright Act cannot 
be transferred, whole kit and caboodle, to defamation without modification. 
Defamatory content can cause significant harm to reputation, and some 
mechanism should be available for users, in limited circumstances, to disable 
access to the offending content short of obtaining a court order. Although human 
rights-based intermediary models, such as the Manila Principles, recommend that 
content should be restricted only by court order, this poses an access to justice 
problem in the area of defamation disputes, where there is a high-volume of 
disputes, largely comprised of complainants without the finances for a lengthy 
lawsuit. A better approach is to codify detailed rules for intermediaries to reduce 
the risk of over-removal of content179 and provide due process.180 Ideally, reform 
to intermediary liability would be complemented with improved access to justice 
through creation of online tribunals to hear defamation disputes.181
Several aspects of this proposal require elaboration.
1. TypES OF INTERMEDIARIES
Intermediaries that merely provide access to the internet (generally known as 
mere conduits or common carriers), such as ISPs solely in that capacity, should 
have no obligations under these recommendations. Rather, we recommend 
that these rules target intermediaries that provide platforms for user-generated 
content. Concerning mixed-use sites, where the intermediary both hosts content 
175. Zeran, supra note 105 (this early case is illustrative here). The court’s interpretation of section 
230 in that case is consistently applied in the case law.
176. Crookes, supra note 2.
177. Grant, supra note 6.
178. 2008 SCC 40.
179. See Bridy & Keller, supra note 78 at 23.
180. See the Manila Principles, supra note 58.
181. See Emily Laidlaw, “Re-Imagining Resolution of Online Defamation Disputes” (2019) 56 
Osgoode Hall LJ 162 at 197 [Laidlaw, “Re-Imagining Resolution”].
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and creates content, the question is one of publication. Where an internet 
provider publishes (in the recommended sense of intentionally conveying 
specific defamatory content), it would not be an intermediary for the purposes 
of these rules.
We recommend that search engines be treated similarly to those subject to the 
notice and notice system under the Copyright Act. This means that search engines 
would not have an obligation to forward a complaint. Rather, a defamation 
plaintiff could only obtain an injunction against the provider to remove search 
results. However, if a search provider is notified that content has been removed 
from the source, the search provider should remove the search result within a 
reasonable period of time.
2. CONTENT OF NOTICE OF COMpLAINT
Learning from the flawed execution of Canada’s notice and notice framework, 
namely the failure to enact regulations mandating the content of such notices, 
we recommend codification of the requirements of defamation notices. Such 
codification has provided a level of certainty under the DMCA.
A notice of complaint should include the allegedly defamatory content 
and internet identifier (identifying information the third party used for 
communication); the legal basis for the claim that the content is defamatory; 
what the complainant wants, such as content removal, an apology and so on; the 
complainant’s contact information; and a statement that the complaint is made 
in good faith as to its accuracy.182 A notice of complaint should be prohibited 
from including settlement demands or otherwise making unlawful demands. 
This avoids the problem that arose with the notice and notice system under 
the Copyright Act, where copyright holders were using their notices to demand 
money, and often in greater amounts than would have been available as damages. 
An intermediary should not forward an incomplete notice.
Further comment is required on a few of these criteria. While a complainant 
should identify the legal basis of a claim, this does not elucidate how much 
information is necessary to achieve that threshold. The ECD, for example, 
requires evidence of unlawfulness, which in a defamation context means more 
than mere evidence that content is prima facie defamatory. Rather, it requires 
evidence that the defamation is unlawful in the sense that there are no reasonably 
182. Some of these suggestions are drawn from the Manila Principles. See e.g. Manila Principles, 
supra note 58, principle 3.
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available defences.183 While a notice and notice regime is different than the 
liability-based framework of the ECD, the question remains as to the level of 
detail necessary in the notice of complaint.
We recommend that more than a simple allegation of defamation is necessary 
to forward a notice. This requires the complainant to state some reason, such as 
that the information is not true. It is not the goal to weigh down a complainant 
with legalese without the benefit, in most situations, of a lawyer. However, 
a complaint form might indicate points for a complainant to consider, modeled 
on the various elements of defamation and defences.184 This kind of educational 
role is evident in British Columbia’s Civil Resolution Tribunal, an online tribunal 
to resolve small claims and condo disputes, where information and drop-down 
menus help litigants understand and diagnose their problem, as well as find the 
language to communicate their claim.185
We recommend that all notices of complaint include a declaration that 
the complaint is made in good faith as to its accuracy. The risk to a bad faith 
complainant is perjury or potentially a civil action for misrepresentation. As Bridy 
and Keller note, “this ‘scary legal language’”186 in the DMCA has a deterrent 
effect on abusive content removal requests.
Indeed, in Bridy and Keller’s view the strongest counter-balance to an 
NTD regime like the DMCA, one that reduces the number of removals of 
lawful content, is found in “well-crafted removal procedures,”187 including no 
monitoring requirements, a good faith, and detailed notice requirements.188 
In our view, such procedures will also help alleviate over-removal of content 
under the notice-and-notice-plus model.
183. This puts aside the question of whether the intermediary, pursuant to its terms of service, 
requires this level of detail before disabling access to content.
184. For complaints purposes this might shift the burden, wherein the complainant must not 
only make his or her case, but also resolve any defences. The impact is softened, because 
this is only for the purpose of the notice of complaint, rather than shifting the burden in a 
cause of action generally. There is support for this approach with similarly operated Ontario 
legislation. See Protection of Public Participation Act, 2015, SO 2015, c 23.
185. See “Home – Civil Resolution Tribunal,” Civil resolution Tribunal, online: 
<civilresolutionbc.ca>.
186. Bridy & Keller, supra note 78 at 23.
187. Ibid.
188. Ibid.
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3. ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN
There is a risk of abuse of a complaints system. We recommend that a small 
administrative fee be permissible for processing complaints. This recommendation 
is made with some trepidation. Most social networking providers currently process 
complaints for free. An administrative fee serves two purposes. First, it serves to 
dissuade the casual complainer from proceeding with a complaint. This goes some 
way to alleviating the concern that content can be removed without court order, 
by creating a hurdle for complainants to make the complaint in the first place. 
Second, it acknowledges that codification of intermediary responsibility increases 
intermediary burdens. We recommend further exploration of the uses to which 
such a fee would be put. Suggestions made to the authors include holding the 
fee in escrow to be returned to the complainant if content is removed, directing 
fees to an organization that in some way serves complainants in the area of online 
abuse, providing the fee to intermediaries to ease the administrative burden, and/
or only providing fees to small and medium sized intermediaries.189
Caution must be exercised. In AT v Globe24h.com, a Federal Court 
characterized the defendant website, which among other things, republished 
court decisions for free online and searchable on Google, and charged a fee to 
remove cases from the website, as follows: “[The website’s] primary purpose is to 
incentivize individuals to pay to have their personal information removed from 
the website.”190 By permitting an administrative fee, the goal is to help ensure 
complaints are made in good faith not incentivize new, exploitive business models. 
Depending on the fee arrangement, there is a risk that a fee might encourage 
a website owner not to manage its services responsibly, relying on the fees to 
prompt action (and with more complaints, the operator receives more money).
4. DISCRETION
One important issue to be resolved is whether intermediaries should have 
discretion to depart from these rules when it comes to forwarding notices or 
removing content. The lack of discretion in the Copyright Act meant ISPs had to 
forward notices they knew were illegitimate. Intermediaries as first responders 
are familiar with repeat complaints or complainants, bulk requests, and specious 
claims. One option is to allow for discretion in easy cases. In such a scenario, 
a clearly defamatory post would be taken down regardless of whether the person 
responsible responds to a notice, while a clearly malicious and unfounded 
189. We thank various participants of RightsCon 2018 for their suggestions.
190. 2017 FC 114 at para 71.
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complaint would be ignored and not result in a takedown even if the person 
responsible does not respond.
The problem, however, is in deciding what constitutes an easy case. Without 
clear guidance on this, allowing discretion might have the effect of defeating the 
very purpose of these recommendations. Intermediaries would be placed in the 
position of assessing the merits of a claim.
Given this, we recommend discretion only where the complainant is 
vexatious. This concept would have to be defined, but this could be done with 
reference to the doctrine of vexatious litigants and perhaps abuse of process more 
generally. Beyond vexatious complaints, however, caution is warranted. While 
discretion is helpful in theory, in practice it may be unworkable to define its 
limits so as not to undo the benefits that flow from notice-and-notice-plus.
5. TIMING
The timing for content removal is a point of uncertainty. In a Canadian context, 
the court concluded in Pritchard v Van Nes191 that the appropriate time for 
removal of defamatory content, in that situation, was immediately.192 The 
European Commission recommends that platforms should remove terrorist 
related content within one hour of notification193 and a 24-hour timeframe 
was imposed in Germany’s NetzDG194 for removal of hate speech. The ECD 
and DMCA require that intermediaries act “expeditiously.”195 As Jaani Riordan 
explains, the lack of clarity in the ECD creates confusion. While it is expected 
that an objective standard is used looking at a reasonable intermediary in all 
the circumstances, it is unclear, among other things, whether the duty to act 
expeditiously is triggered upon notice or knowledge of actual illegality, and 
191. Pritchard, supra note 19.
192. Ibid at para 109.
193. EU, Commission, Commission Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle illegal content 
online (Brussels: EC, 2018) at para 35 (following up from the 2017 Communication). See 
EC, Commission, Communication Tackling Illegal Content Online: towards an enhanced 
responsibility of online platforms (Brussels: COM, 2017).
194. Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Rechtsdurchsetzung in Sozialen Netzwerken [Act to Improve 
Enforcement of the Law in Social Networks], Federal Law Gazette I No 61 at 3352, 2017. The 
legislation is commonly referred to as NetzDG. An official English translation is available 
online: <www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Gesetzgebungsverfahren/Dokumente/NetzDG_engl.
pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2> [perma.cc/79Q8-V57E].
195. ECD, supra note 30, art 14; DMCA, supra note 53, ss 512(b)(2)(E), (c)(1)(A)(iii), (c)(1)(C), 
(d)(1)(C), (d)(3).
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whether it is contingent on the intermediary being successful at removal of the 
content in question.196
There is a tension between how quickly reputation can be damaged online 
and the speed with which an intermediary can reasonably process a complaint, 
particularly if the goal is to counteract over-removal of content and provide due 
process. For example, Facebook receives approximately two million requests per 
week for content removal.197 Time must be provided for the intermediary to 
assess the notice of complaint, pass the notice to the third party, and time for the 
third party to respond. In our view, a 24-hour time frame is unreasonably short 
if the end result is potentially content removal without a court order. Rather, 
we recommend setting the timing from receipt of the notice of complaint to 
content takedown at approximately two days.
6. MINIMAL IMpAIRMENT
Content removal should be narrowly targeted so as to avoid disproportionate 
interference with the right to free expression. In practice, this means that specific 
content should be removed, rather than entire URLs, threads, groups, et cetera. 
Concerning geographic scope of content removal, where content removal can 
be limited in this way, we recommend that, in most circumstances, limiting 
removal geographically is appropriate and necessary for minimal impairment. 
We nevertheless acknowledge that, pursuant to Google v Equustek,198 worldwide 
delisting from search results is sometimes appropriate.
7. MONITORING
Intermediaries should have no obligation to monitor for defamatory content. 
This recommendation is consistent with international human rights principles, 
in particular, respect for privacy. In addition, a monitoring system burdens the 
intermediary and places it in the role of censor. Indeed, one of our justifications 
for changing the definition of publication was that the current definition of 
publication incentivizes monitoring.
196. Riordan, supra note 30 at paras 12.144-12.149.
197. Jeffrey Rosen, “The Delete Squad: Google, Twitter, Facebook and the New Global 
Battle over the Future of Free Speech” New Republic, (29 April 2013), online: <www.
newrepublic.com/article/113045/free-speech-internet-silicon-valley-making-rules> [perma.
cc/SMC2-FTKN]. See also Facebook, “Community Standards Enforcement Preliminary 
Report” Facebook, online: <transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement> 
[perma.cc/HV7M-CSFV].
198. 2017 SCC 34.
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We recommend that legislation explicitly exclude both general and specific 
monitoring, learning from the confusion evident in the ECD regime. The 
ECD theoretically insulates intermediaries from this pressure through Article 
15, which provides that there is no obligation for an intermediary to monitor 
information on its services. However, this is softened by Recital 47 of the ECD, 
which differentiates between monitoring of a general nature, which member 
states are prohibited from requiring, and monitoring in a specific case, which is 
permissible. The problem is that the line between specific and general monitoring 
is not always clear.199 For example, if Facebook is notified of defamatory content 
hosted on its service and deletes the post, is Facebook required to monitor to 
prevent re-uploads?200
A lesson from the European experience is that a clear prohibition of mandatory 
monitoring provides better certainty. The DMCA opts for such certainty, 
directing that the safe harbour for intermediaries for copyright infringement does 
not require that the intermediary monitor its services or “affirmatively seek[] facts 
indicating infringing activity… .”201
8. SITES THAT SOLICIT UNLAWFUL CONTENT
Some have suggested stricter rules for sites that solicit unlawful content. We reject 
a special rule. As noted in Jones,202 discussed above, it is difficult to delineate the 
differences between legitimate sites soliciting, for example, consumer reviews, 
and the site that was the subject of that litigation. If legislators consider such a 
provision, we recommend narrowly targeting sites that are devoted to or solicit 
comments that defame individuals, excluding sites that provide platforms for 
business reviews.
199. As Riordan commented about article 15, “[i]t is difficult to delineate precisely the boundary 
between monitoring which is specific and that which is general.” Supra note 31 at para 13.49.
200. See L’Oreal SA v eBay International AG (2011), [2012] All ER (EC) 501 (ECJ); 
Bundesgerichtshof [Federal Court of Justice of Germany], GEMA v Rapidshare (2013), 
I ZR 80/12; CA Paris, 14 January 2011, Google Inc c Compagnie des phares et balises; 
CA Paris, 14 January 2011, Google Inc c Bac Films, The Factory; CA Paris, 14 January 2011, 
Google Inc c Bac Films, The Factory, Canal+; CA Paris, 14 January 2011, Google Inc c Les Films 
de la Croisade, Goatworks Films (France); AY v Facebook (Ireland) Ltd & Others, [2016] NIQB 
76 (note that this case was settled in 2018).
201. DMCA, supra note 53, s 512(m). See, however, Bridy & Keller, supra note 78 at 33 (discusses 
how there are ways around the no monitor rule).
202. Jones, supra note 111.
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9. ANONyMITy
In some situations, the third party will use a real name or other identifiable 
information. However, sometimes the third party posts the allegedly defamatory 
content anonymously. In the latter situation, the third party should remain 
anonymous except through a court order. In other words, it is not the role of 
the intermediary to out anonymous users to complainants. In practice, if the 
intermediary can communicate with the anonymous third party, the notice of 
complaint would be passed on, and a response potentially received. However, 
through this process an intermediary should not provide the complainant 
with personally identifying information of the third party.203 Otherwise, there 
would be a significant risk the complaints system would be abused to identify 
anonymous users.
10. DUE pROCESS
The Manila Principles emphasize the need for clear and unambiguous content 
restriction practices that provide due process.204 In practice this means users 
should have the right to be heard, to hear the case against them, the right to 
appeal or review of a decision, reinstatement of content when appropriate, and 
provision of reasons.
We are particularly conscious that some content will be removed without 
court order albeit in limited circumstances. This makes due process an important 
part of intermediary content restriction practices even if privately crafted. 
Therefore, legislation should mandate that private remedial frameworks have 
certain characteristics modeled on due process principles.
In particular, the third party subject to the notice should be provided the 
opportunity to dispute the allegations in the notice of complaint. In practice, 
such a notice of dispute would allege that the content is lawful, whether it is 
because the content posted is true, a statement of opinion, and so on. Like the 
notice of complaint, a dispute notice form might indicate points for the third 
party to consider, modeled on the various elements of defamation and defences. 
Where a third party disputes the defamation allegations, the intermediary is not 
required to remove the content. The complainant in such a situation can seek a 
court order for content removal.
Reasons should be provided to the complainant and third party for the 
decision to remove or not remove content, including identifying a put back 
203. See also Manila Principles, supra note 58, principle 5.
204. Ibid, principles 3, 5 and 6.
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procedure. The DMCA provides a put back procedure for content that has 
been disabled but is then challenged. The DMCA does not seamlessly apply 
to the rules herein, because content is not removed under these rules unless 
the third party fails to challenge the removal, while the DMCA operates as 
an NTD regime, meaning content can be taken down upon receiving notice. 
In the notice-and-notice-plus model, one imagines a third party might miss the 
deadline for responding to a notice of complaint. In such circumstances, if a third 
party wishes to challenge the notice, the intermediary should provide a put back 
procedure, where technically feasible, for the content. This recommendation is 
made because the content will have been removed without judicial authority.
Further, intermediaries should communicate that content has been challenged 
and/or removed. Options include, but are not limited to, a flag or similar symbol, 
or discursive solution such as rights of reply or information on the dispute.205
11. CORpORATE RESpONSIBILITy
Intermediaries should be encouraged to manage abusive content on their 
platforms in compliance with the duty to respect human rights as set out in the 
United Nations Guiding Principles.206 It is the state’s duty to protect human rights. 
This might entail the state fulfilling this obligation by codifying a requirement 
that intermediary content restriction procedures comply with human rights 
principles (e.g., prescribed by law, necessity, proportionality, transparency, 
accountability, and due process). This might also be effected by requiring that an 
intermediary’s terms of service and other management of content on its services, 
such as its remedial mechanisms for disputes, be taken into account in assessing 
the suitability or amount of a fine.
Furthermore, transparency is critical to a legitimate, human rights-compliant 
intermediary regime. Intermediaries should be obligated to publish their content 
restriction policies, including annual reports detailing restriction practices 
205. Frank Pasquale examines the viability of a right of reply in two articles. See Frank Pasquale 
“Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility” (2006) 54 Clev St L Rev 115; Frank Pasquale 
“Asterisk Revisited: Debating a Right of Reply on Search Results” (2008) 3 J Bus & Tech L 
61. See also Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms That Control Money 
and Information (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015) especially at ch 3. See also 
David S Ardia, “Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of 
Defamation Law” (2010) 45 Harv CR-CLL Rev 261. He explores more discursive technical 
solution such as flagging content as disputed. Alastair Mullis & Andrew Scott, “Reframing 
Libel: Taking (All) Rights Seriously and Where It Leads” (2012) 63 N Ir Leg Q 5 at 19-21 
(advocating for discursive remedies).
206. Guiding Principles, supra note 139.
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(both state and private requests).207 This kind of regulation through reporting 
requirements is observable in section 417(5) the UK’s Companies Act208 (requiring 
companies discuss their CSR policies in their annual reports),209 or to address 
a particular issue, such as reporting of supply chain management concerning 
trafficking and slavery.210 A similar provision in defamation legislation for 
intermediaries would aim to incentivize responsible management of services, 
focusing on the procedures in place.
12. FINE
If an intermediary fails to comply with these rules, a complainant’s only option 
vis-à-vis the intermediary should be to apply for an order by a court imposing a 
fine. We make no recommendations on the appropriate amount for such a fine, 
although we note that the Copyright Act sets statutory damages in the amount 
at $5,000–$10,000. We recommend that courts have discretion to determine 
fines in a way that reflects the reasons for, and effects of, intermediaries’ failure to 
comply with the regulations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our aim has been to craft defamation laws and intermediary regulations that strike 
the best balance between freedom of expression and protection of reputation, 
while promoting a wide set of principles and while acknowledging the incentives 
that laws create. Inevitably, some will disagree with our choices. Indeed, when we 
presented notice-and-notice-plus to experts, some thought it went too far, while 
others thought it did not go far enough. This is perhaps the hallmark of a viable 
compromise approach.
Although there is room for debate about where we have drawn certain lines, 
some aspects of the proposal are, we believe, uncontentious. Three important 
aspects are highlighted: First, the law of defamation is badly out of date and 
207. Ranking Digital Rights, supra note 154. The corporate accountability index reports that 
the companies studied provide minimal information, if any, concerning private requests for 
content removal compared to government requests.
208. 2006 (UK), c 46.
209. Laidlaw, Regulating Speech, supra note 138 at 248. Note criticism of this type of provision for 
encouraging corporate social responsibility for freedom of expression online (ibid). However, 
for the purposes of defamation legislation, and the narrow target on procedures, such a 
provision might be effective.
210. See California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, Cal Civ Code, § 1714.43 (2010). See also 
Modern Slavery Act 2015 (UK), c 30.
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should be modernized—not only in the realm of internet intermediary liability 
but with regard to the publication element generally. Second, approaches to 
intermediary regulation should not be one-size-fits-all. Intermediaries’ response 
to child sexual imagery should be different than that to copyright infringement 
or to defamation. Third, any regulatory approach must protect human rights 
both substantively (promoting free speech and protecting reputation) and 
procedurally (ensuring due process and transparency).
We believe that changes to defamation law combined with notice-and-notice-
plus would be a vast improvement over the status quo. However, we remain 
especially concerned about the prospect of content over-removal under 
notice-and-notice-plus. If the model were adopted, we hope that legislators and 
others would closely monitor it, investigating in particular who files notices, 
how many, how often there are counter-notices, how often content is removed, 
whether timelines are adhered to, whether there are abuses, and whether 
intermediaries are transparent. Adjustments can then be made as necessary, and 
as technology evolves.
